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CONTENTS

AFGHANISTAN

- Afghans Seething, Oppose Russian Occupiers
(Frederic Smelt; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 14 Jun 80)..... 1
- 'Genuine Cooperation' With 'Northern Neighbor' Lauded
(HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR; 12 May 80) 6

ALGERIA

- Union Officials Discuss Central Committee Meeting
(REVOLUTION AFRICAINE; 23-29 May 80) 8

IRAN

- Recent Clashes in Tehran a Prelude to Civil War
(Eric Rouleau; LE MONDE, 14 Jun 80) 16

IRAQ

- Industry Minister Offers Projects During Sweden Visit
(Bjorn Lindahl; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 1 Jun 80) 20

LEBANON

- United Nations Forces Face Trouble in South
(AL-DUSTUR; 5-11 May 80) 22
- Interneccine Strife Flares Within Christian Right
(AL-DUSTUR; 19-25 May 80) 29
- Briefs
 Army Weapons Deals 31
 Graduation of Trainees 31

MAURITANIA

Economic Development Depends on Finding Additional Water (CHAAH; 6 Jun 80)	32
---	----

SUDAN

Power Struggle in South Ends With Alier on Top (SUDANOW; Jun 80)	36
Political Impasse Broken What Went Wrong	
'SUDANOW' Reports on Four Developmental Projects (SUDANOW; Jun 80)	43

TUNISIA

Mzali Interview in Saudi Publication Reported (Mohamed Mzali Interview; LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 10 Jun 80)	52
Mzali Praised for Realistic Approach (Editorial; LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 30 May 80)	57
Outcome, Conduct, Significance of Municipal Elections (Various sources; 26-28 May 80)	58
Cuiga Assesses Elections 'DIALOGUE' Assesses Elections by Hammadi Ben Hammud	

AFGHANS SEETHING, OPPOSE RUSSIAN OCCUPIERS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Jun 80 p 7

[Report from Afghan capital by Frederic Smelt: "Parents Are Called at Night To Come to the Cemetery--The Bloody Balance Sheet of the High School and College Student Demonstrations in Kabul"]

[Text] The political situation in Afghanistan resembles a smoldering fuse of which no one can say for sure whether it is going out or igniting.

If the objective of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was not only to pursue imperialist power politics but to spread its own ideology and protect a communist party, it acted on the basis of extraordinarily bad advice. The presence of its expeditionary force is continually weakening the influence of the Communist Party of Afghanistan, which never was strong anyway, and is leading to a new awareness of Islam, to which, because it was so much being taken for granted, many people previously had never devoted any thought. While there is no Khomeyni in Afghanistan as yet, there is a continual increase, for men and women, of the prerequisites for combining the anti-Soviet feelings and the new awareness of Islam in a political mass movement.

The strongest emotional expression of this trend so far was the high school and college student demonstrations in Kabul in April and May.

It all started before the new change in the national flag slated for 21 April in Kabul, with rumors circulating beforehand. "Night letters" calling for a general strike went from hand to hand despite the fact that those distributing them faced severe punishment. The high school and college students were to start it off, with the bazaar, employees, workers and, above all, the numerous civil servants in Kabul following suit. The strike began hesitantly. Most citizens of Kabul have been affected too deeply by the shock of the terror of the Taraki and Amin governments and also are very much afraid of the secret police. On 21 April, 80 to 100 students left Habibia High School and went to the nearby university campus to call on the college students to go on strike. Shortly before they reached the campus, they were stopped by police and

and party militia and driven apart. The almost playful mood changed, and shots were fired. No eyewitness later was able to say for sure whether the shots were fired at the students or into the air. The youths dispersed--except for a couple, who were carried off on a stretcher.

The news spread like lightning in Kabul, canceling the change of flags, in which no one outside the party was interested anyway. Thenceforth no regular classes were held in Kabul any longer. Parents no longer sent their children to school because they were afraid that they might be injured or at least imprisoned, for a large number of students at Habibia High School had been arrested. Those boys and girls who still went to school refused to attend regular classes, involving their teachers in political discussions with the sole topic "What is the simplest and least bloody way of getting the Russians to leave Afghanistan?"

On 24 April the students at Omar-i-Shahid High School staged a demonstration.

Then, at least on the surface, Kabul became quiet again. The security forces were reinforced, because on 27 April the party was celebrating the second anniversary of its coup d'etat.

'Go Ahead and Shoot' Shouted the Girls

One day later, 28 April, the girls of the Suryya and the Rabia-Balkhi high schools took to the street. The girls walked along laughing and apparently in good humor, their shouts of "Death to the Russians" and "Death to Brezhnev" sounding strangely unreal, almost peaceful. The mood became somewhat more aggressive only after they encountered a counterdemonstration of people whom the party had sent to the scene in three busloads. There were pell-mell shouts of "Death to imperialism", "Long live imperialism", "Death to the Russians" and "Long live Afghan-Russian friendship". Then the demonstrators separated again, and the girls went on. When they saw Russian personnel carriers in a side street, the mood became even more aggressive, and stones were flung at the trucks. The slogan "Death to the Russians" now sounded more sinister. While the Russian soldiers did not let themselves be provoked, the Afghan security forces now moved closer to the girls. A helicopter circled overhead. The first warning shots were fired. The girls went on, casting their white school veils over the police and shouting: "Go home", "Change diapers", "Sweep floors", "You are the women, for you did not defend Afghanistan against the Russians and are not doing so now either."

Many of the police, the majority of whom do not favor the Russian occupation forces but only want to survive these times, played along with the girls. The party militia fired into the air. Some of the girls tore open their jackets shouting: "Go ahead and shoot. There is no use living in a Russian country."

Now, for a few seconds, a mood of despair breaks through, the despair in Kabul, the despair of people who just do not want to live in a Russian-occupied, communist-ruled country. It is neither a political confrontation nor a political program. The anger goes much deeper, what with the people sensing that, without there being any need for it, they are to give up their identity. I hear an Afghan student say in front of Russian pictures: "We are farmers but not collective farmers. Whoever paints constantly smiling harvest workers has never worked on the land."

The girls go on and finally reach Amani High School, built by the FRG, which has teachers from the FRG to this day. The school yard is getting crowded, but the students cannot leave, the principal having had the doors locked. There are shouts of "Russians, quit Afghanistan" on both sides of the iron fence, but a joint demonstration is impossible.

Finally the teachers manage to push part of the Amani students into the classrooms, and the girls go home in groups. A few minutes later the Khahrahi-Ansari lies peacefully in the sun again. Now Soviet correspondents could come back and film everyday life in Kabul--the donkey hauling an overflowing bag of tomatoes, taxis, small school boys coming out of some elementary school. Buses carrying students that have been arrested, they might take for--or allege to be--school buses.

In the next couple of days, 29 and 30 April, there were strikes and protests at all Kabul high schools, the university, the Soviet-directed polytechnic school and the teachers college. Even elementary school students joined their rebellious elders, competing with them in shouts of "We are no Russians, we are Afghans".

The next clash between students and security organs occurred at the most distinguished and select high school for girls in Kabul, the Malalai School. The girls were standing in the schoolyard shouting "Why doesn't the United Nations hear us?" and "Why doesn't anyone help us in the fight against the Russians?" In between the by now almost ritualizing call of "Russians, quit Afghanistan", and "Death to the Russians", "Long live Afghanistan", "Long live Islam".

The principal had the school yard locked, partly to prevent the students from going into the street and partly to prevent the security forces from entering the school grounds. The latter, she failed to accomplish. When the girls did not cease with their shouts of protest, the party militia climbed over the school walls with the aid of ladders. Shots were fired despite the fact that none of the girls were armed and the students had long since tried to run away. But of course they were unable to, the school yard having been locked. The pursuit extended to the classrooms. When it was all over, one or two girls lay dead in the school yard, several had been injured, others arrested.

What the Police Whispered

The biggest demonstration proceeded from the university to the Ministry of Education. Long before they reached the ministry, the college and high school students were surrounded and beaten by police on foot and on horseback. For a long time they held out and did not disperse. They tried to convince the police that they should make common cause with them. Only after more and more of them had been grabbed and put in the buses that were standing by, did they try to flee into the mountains which here almost extend to the street. People living in the houses on the slopes took them in and fed them. Many also received native clothes in order not to fall into the hands of the police again.

They were not pursued into the mountains, primarily probably because the police did not want to chase after them. Many students later told about policemen having whispered to them, "Do not give up", and then let them slip through the barriers.

At noon parents and brothers and sisters gathered before the closed gate of the Police Presidium to learn something about where their children or brothers and sisters were and to supply them with clothing and food. The gate remained shut. A couple of soldiers with machineguns were squatting right and left of the gate, gazing not very happily at the crowd below them. But all remained peaceful, even when a couple of Russian personnel carriers with soldiers drew up some distance away. Many of the relatives remained standing there for hours, without getting to see their children that day.

In the evening, at the place of a family in the suburbs, a meal is being prepared, but the woman of the house is not taking any part in it. The family is sitting in almost complete silence. The 13-year-old daughter has not returned from school. Alia did not return home; nor will she return home again. She was shot and killed at the Kabul High School on 30 April--because, together with her classmates in the schoolyard she had shouted, "God, not the Russians, give us Afghanistan". At night the parents received a call to come to the cemetery at the foot of the tomb of Nadir Shah. On this cemetery reserved for women, eight wooden coffins are interred that night. It is a clear full-moon night, with the mountains in sharp outline against the light. The silhouettes of a couple of Russian tanks are stretching skyward.

Those arrested came home a day later, after having to sign a statement that they had erred and would not participate in future demonstrations. The arrested girls had been addressed personally by Minister of Education Dr Anahita Ratebzad. One girl commented: "She not only forces us to lie but causes us to be ashamed of ourselves. I signed because I was afraid of Pul-i-Kharhi (a concentration camp near Kabul)".

Nor did the high school and college student demonstrations cease during the first half of May. Time and again smallish or sizable groups of children and juveniles marched through districts of Kabul shouting, "Russians, quit Afghanistan".

Perhaps one of the most touching demonstrations occurs in Qulula Pushta, a suburb of Kabul. A bunch of children, wide-eyed, in all kinds of clothing stand around a kindergarten, shoving one another or looking away in embarrassment and shouting--or rather squeaking--"We won't drink any more milk as long as the Russians are in Afghanistan". The whole district gathers to look at the children with all-embracing parental pride. Apparently even the party militia cannot dissociate itself from it; it remains at a distance.

Across the Border for 1,000 Deutsche Marks

Of course someone had coached the children. In addition to violent resistance, Afghanistan is beginning to learn passive resistance. Things are not as picturesquely militant and warlike in Afghanistan as European and American war correspondents sometimes report them to be. Even the guns and belts of ammunition of the nomads often represent only traditional manly threatening gestures and are meant for defense against wolves and other animals rather than for fighting an enemy. This explains, among other things, why the partisan warfare got off to a slow start.

This is changing increasingly, because the Afghans are learning, and are also being successful, and probably also because the Soviet forces do not suffice--and partly are also not trained--for laborious guerrilla warfare.

While the Afghan Army still exists, its readiness for action is small because most of those subject to military service do not really fight their compatriots. When it comes down to it, they go home, flee to Pakistan or Iran or try to get by somehow. Early in May several age groups were called up; in Kabul thereupon most young men apparently went immediately to go-betweens to take them to one of the neighboring countries for the equivalent of about 1,000 deutsche marks.

The economic situation is deteriorating constantly. The exchange of goods is shrinking because no road is safe. Plants are not operating for lack of raw materials. Workmen often go without work for days. Unemployment is increasing. This state of affairs may go on for years. Even if they proceed more massively and brutally than they have so far, the Soviet soldiers will not really be able to control the country. Nor will the mojahedin be able to win in the foreseeable future, for they lack organization, training and arms.

'GENUINE COOPERATION' WITH 'NORTHERN NEIGHBOR' LAUDED

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in Dari 12 May 80 p 2

/Article: "The Fruits of Fraternal Friendship and Unprecedented Cooperation"/

/Text/ In the process of the class struggle, be it political, social or economic, a dividing line must always be drawn between friends and enemies, and this line must be expanded to the limits of the international struggle between the two systems--that is, those systems which are based on foundations of imperialism, tyranny and exploitation and systems which are founded on bases of justice, progress and real democracy. This line becomes drawn with complete clarity and further illumination in the international relations of /illegible/ countries which have newly acquired their independence and have been kept backward, since they have risen, from the very start of the nation's struggles for salvation from the grip of imperialism and colonialism, to the time these struggles resulted in the establishment of democratic national regimes. Obviously, there are two basic forces in the world, those supporting these struggles and those promoting and creating barriers in their way. That is, in the broad front of those who want the bases of imperialism and colonialism to be destroyed and the various types and forms of dominance by monopoly capital to disappear, one can mention, as forces for national liberation and the movements for national salvation of the backward countries, the great camp of the socialist countries and the forces of the international movement of the working class, which constitutes more than two thirds of the world; in the other front, one can mention those who in one way or another, and in one form or another, strive to keep the dominance of the international monopolies in the areas and corners of the world strong or to expand it. So far, especially with the strengthening of detente and good cooperation among countries possessing different systems, there has been an escalating line and progress in such struggles and arraying of ranks and this has been crystallized further in the expansion of cooperation between the advanced socialist countries, headed by the union of the soviets, and other countries. If a brief glance is cast at the events of the past decade in the world, the climax of the movement of national liberation and the creation of independent and progressive countries can most clearly be seen, and

this is the true, proper evidence of our claim, which is based on the fact that arch-criminal imperialism, headed by America, has turned into the enemy of first rank of the toiling and tyrannized people of the world and everyone has risen up in a common rank to struggle against it. This climax of struggle, following the creation and construction of democratic and national governments, has been accompanied by the unconditional, unrestricted, timely cooperation of the camp of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, since, /in/ poor countries which have nothing and have been kept backward, most of whose national and human resources have been pillaged following their dominance by imperialism and colonialism, or dominance by regimes dependent on imperialism, or have been left untouched, the establishment of such societies in normal fashion would either not have been possible or would have entailed many difficulties, most of which would have had to end with the creation of a capitalist society in the course of a tortuous route, without the cooperation and aid without political or economic restrictions or conditions on the part of the advanced socialist countries. Has not the aid and support of the advanced socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, for the movements of national salvation and democracy in the world, in their struggles against imperialism, on a worldwide scale, enabled these countries to preserve their complete stability and solidity in the face of imperialism and proceed to build new economic and social systems in their countries? If we look at Afghanistan's friendly relations since the declaration of its independence, friendship and cooperation with the country of the soviets has held such an important and valuable place that it has in reality been through the expansion of this friendship and cooperation that the foundation stones of new Afghan society have been laid. Since the beginning this cooperation and aid have followed an escalating course toward perfection; without a doubt they have had a deep qualitative link with the escalating course toward perfection of the struggles against imperialism, against feudalism and against the tyrannization of the masses of the people of our nation.

With the glorious April revolution, in particular with the start of the new stage of this revolution, relations, cooperation and good neighborliness with our great northern neighbor have reached a degree of brotherly friendship and international solidarity. Not only do these have, and have had, a positive, important and valuable effect in building and constructing our new society--the scale of the balance of justice and progress has also gained further weight in the balance of forces in the international level, and the status and importance of revolutionary Afghanistan have increased in the world. While we mention a part of this cooperation in these lines, and mention them with pride and self-respect, in order to play a role in strengthening and deepening this long-standing fraternal friendship, we must mention the conclusion of work and the entry into operation of the Jaraqdoq-Shiburghan gas project which was completed 3 years ago with the cooperation and friendly, unblemished aid of the Soviet Union, the friendly country and great neighbor of Afghanistan, we must hold dear the inauguration and exploitation of it, which took place in the shortest possible time, and must sincerely grasp the hand of eternal brotherly friendship between the peoples of independent, proud Afghanistan and the peoples of the union of the soviets and all toiling peoples.

UNION OFFICIALS DISCUSS CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 23-29 May 80 pp 9-12

[Text] Like the first and second sessions before it, the third session also generated much interest among the masses whose preoccupation remains centered on the proper and full implementation of the adopted resolutions.

If need be, experience could confirm that the social forces of the revolution are available to watch uncompromisingly over safeguarding and expanding achievements. Officials of the mass organizations we contacted wanted to explain this determination. Demène Debbih Abdallah, Djellouli Nouredine and Nadjem Aissa, secretaries general of, respectively, UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers], UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth] and UNPA [National Union of Algerian Peasants] discuss below the results of the recent session of the Central Committee and the hopes it raised among the mass organizations.

UGTA: "The Adopted Resolutions Form a Solid Base For Giving New Impetus to Self-Management and Cooperatives"

[Question] What did UGTA contributed to the third session of the Central Committee concerning the issues which affect the large working classes more directly?

[Answer] UGTA is a mass organization of the FLN Party and, consequently, it is an integral part of all party activities. In this context, its primary contribution is to express faithfully through its officials within the Party, the workers' aspirations and hopes.

Problems placed on the agenda of each session of the Central Committee are so important that the workers must discuss them beforehand if their suggestions are to be realistically beneficial.

Thus, agricultural problems and the role of the private sector in the tourist sector placed on the agenda of the third session of the Central Committee were discussed many times by the workers during their union meetings.

Workers and union officials were able to give their militant and reliable views gained through direct contact with farmers during their stint as volunteers, or through knowledge acquired during studies and debates organized around the National Charter.

Therefore, on the basis of these discussions with union cadres and workers, UGTA officials who are members of the Central Committee, participate in all debates within the party organizations and, notably, the Central Committee.

That is the nature and importance of the UGTA contribution to the work of the third session of the Central Committee and it will continue to contribute to all the activities of the FLN Party.

[Question] Important resolutions were adopted during this session. What is your opinion about them? How do you conceive their implementation?

[Answer] The third session of the Central Committee did effectively adopt important resolutions at the end of lengthy discussions characterized by a spirit of responsibility and militant frankness on the part of Central Committee members.

In the agricultural sector, the adopted resolutions are a sound foundation for launching self-management and agricultural cooperatives while masterfully debunking those who entertain the dream of challenging the Agrarian Revolution.

Decisions taken to end bureaucracy and all obstacles to effective management will incite the farmers to become better aware of the role they must play not only in the interest of the national economy, but also for the improvement of their living and working conditions.

As for the small farmers, taking over their problems and finding solutions will more than likely improve their awareness of the need to unite their efforts to those of the socialist sector to give impetus to our agriculture. They will be the first to benefit from such an action.

In the tourist sector, the resolution of the Central Committee defines the opportunities offered to the non-exploiting private sector to enable it to assume its role fully as outlined by the National Charter. In this context, emigration has been eased. Undoubtedly, this will not fail to stimulate the patriotic fiber of our emigrated brothers for whom everything has been done to bring them back to the motherland.

In addition, the Central Committee defined a development policy for a domestic tourism serving the people and within their reach.

A resolution was passed on the popularization of the use of the national language. Its importance did not escape any Algerian worthy of that name. The goals to be reached and the rational methods for reaching them were clearly defined.

Implementation of this resolution will be assumed by all and at all levels so that the national language will once again regain all the rights of which it is being deprived due to unceasing scheming by the former colonialism.

Finally, the organic resolution adopted by the Central Committee assumes exceptional importance in the sense that it pinpoints noted shortcomings in the party structures and entrusts our brother, the party secretary general, with taking the necessary measures to remedy them.

These measures will undoubtedly be taken to strengthen and, above all, infuse vitality into party structures and state organizations on the basis of /"the-appropriate-official-in-the-appropriate-position"/ [in boldface] principle.

UGTA accepted all the resolutions of the third session of the Central Committee and, for the portion which concerns it, it will do its utmost to mobilize the workers and increase their awareness that they may participate actively in their implementation.

There will be an opportunity to inform the great laboring masses of the content and importance of the Central Committee's resolutions during preparations of the sixth UGTA National Council.

Until the end of May 1980, the general assemblies of the major units and the statutory councils of territorial unions, unions of governorates and federations will make it possible to reach tens of thousands of union cadres and workers. Furthermore, the sixth UGTA National Council which will regroup 700 union cadres from the entire national territory, will propose a work program aimed at making the laboring masses participate in the implementation of the Central Committee's resolutions. Needless to say, workers will also contribute within party meetings.

[Question] In your opinion, what workers' preoccupations should be discussed during the next party congress?

[Answer] According to the recommendations of the fourth party congress, the extraordinary congress scheduled for June 1980 will have to discuss the 5-year development plan.

Meetings are currently being organized to allow workers to participate in large-scale discussions about the draft plan and pass on their suggestions and proposals.

We can already offer that the workers' primary preoccupation may be surmised as follows: they want their proposals which respond to the country's higher interest, to be taken in consideration that they may feel more strongly involved in the effective implementation of the development plan.

The goals of the development plan must be the progressive satisfaction of needs responding to people's legitimate aspirations and to the country's economic independence.

UNJA: A Democratic Cadre of Dialog And Discussions"

[Question] In which way did UNJA contributed to the proceedings of the third session of the Central Committee on questions interesting short- and long-term issues?

[Answer] UNJA, the only youth organization, did indeed contributed quality to the proceedings of the third session as it did to those of the first and second sessions. It did so by continuously holding broad debates among the rank and file, concerning the evaluation of our country's development, the position and role of the state sector, the agricultural situation, health policy, and the position and role of the private sector in the development process. The conclusions drawn by our organization and shared by large sectors (workers, farmers, cadres, etc) of our country's working population confirm that the situation is not as somber and catastrophic as some people would lead us to believe. To be sure, weaknesses, shortcomings, errors, sometimes even differences characterize its choice of economic partners and of some officials called upon to defend state interests and, therefore, the people's. Basically, however, some of the factors of the evaluation conducted by our organization (general assemblies, round tables, national councils) reveal that the situation is not so bad. Our conclusions also prove the accuracy of our fundamental choices and opens up new perspectives. The extraordinary council will not fail to explain the political bases of these conclusions.

We must also recall that youth is involved in everything that is being done, set up, built and developed in the country. It wants to fight alongside its elders--tried in the tough struggle against colonialism--for the edification of a society rid of backward beliefs and superstitions, a society of social justice resolutely looking to progress and democracy.

In the pure tradition of our people, Algerian youth is fighting paternalism and refuses to be pushed aside: /it wants to be up-to-date/ [in boldface].

The Algeria of 1980 is no longer that of 1970 or 1962. The Algeria of 1980 is the rage to know, to learn and discover; it is universities, institutes, lycées and public schools; it is work sites manned by volunteers, amateur theater, the hate of war, suffering and exploitation; it is the /"need for a concrete political life scaled for a developing society"/ [in boldface]. Where do the short- and long-term questions of interest to youth begin? Where do they end? It is a dividing line few young people and patriots can delimitate. For a long time now, Algerian youth has made its struggle part of our country's liberation fight against colonialism. It stands for the total and real independence of Algeria. Today, the struggle continues for the defense of the country and the revolution; for the union and mobilization of all the patriots and revolutionaries around Chadli Bendjedid, the party's secretary general and president of the republic; and for the implementation of the National Charter.

[Question] Important resolutions were passed during this session. Nevertheless, their implementation still remains a subject of preoccupation. How do you conceive it?

[Answer] As a matter of fact, the resolutions of the last session give an inkling of what the next extraordinary party congress will be like. It will not be able to go beyond what the Central Committee agreed to do in complete militant responsibility and truth. Brother Chadli Bendjedid, the party's secretary general, defined the current task in his closing speech: /"The hour is to mobilization and action."/ [in boldface]

More than ever, implementation of this slogan necessitates a search for solutions to all the problems which could stop the progress of our revolution. The many fights conducted by young people and other large segments of the population, as well as their increasing availability for taking charge of their problems and the country's needs, clearly points the way toward which recovery efforts should be directed: offer democratic cadres /in which dialog and discussions/ [in boldface] assume all the political meaning which the party's secretary general never ceases to define: "The basic guarantee of continuity and development of options and fundamental choices are found among the masses, in their unity, their mobilization and their anti-imperialist union around Chadli Bendjedid, the party's secretary general and president of the republic." (Third national council)

[Question] What questions are being asked by young people and, in your opinion, which of these issues should be placed on the agenda of the next FLN congress?

[Answer] As mentioned above, the next extraordinary congress will set forth the general trends of the next plan. Young people will be even more involved in its implementation and development because, for a long time now, they have understood that their future is intimately linked to the socialist option. New demands and needs may have now surfaced--i.e., the need for entertainment in a healthy environment and for healthy and educational recreation--and we must express satisfaction with that development, but what is becoming increasingly apparent is the impossibility /for UNJA alone/ [in boldface] to satisfy all these needs.

The rational use of "the Revolution's Goods" in the interest of youth and the coordinated efforts of all the institutions in charge of the youth sector constitute two essential requirements toward greater participation in the problems of youth, with the necessary corrective measures to be introduced into UNJA's working methods.

1. "Serious and bold efforts are being made toward young people to answer their preoccupations and aspirations positively. It is being done by participating with them in affirmative and responsible actions aimed at finding solution to their social and, sometimes, democratic problems (unemployment, training, etc) and by pushing forward all initiatives aimed at the organization and development of activities to which most young people are sensitive (leisure, culture, sports). At that level, let us note the importance of material means to which the organization must continue to give unremitting attention."

2. "Our activity ceases to be subjected to events and emergencies. In that context, many advances are to be noted in some governorates and communes. Nevertheless, UNJA activities remain cyclical, irregular and most often linked to events or to the celebration of national, international or religious holidays."

"The link with the masses are not acquired solely through the verbal expression of our will and intents, but through our ability to formulate working projects with young people and undertake firm and meaningful activities for their implementation. In that context, the regularity and seriousness of our activities are decisive factors making it possible to broaden the organization's audience and strengthen young people's trust in it and its militants." (Third national council)

UNPA: "The Central Committee's Decisions Reflect the Desire To Promote Agricultural Development"

[Question] An important resolution on agriculture was passed during the third session of the Central Committee. In your opinion, does it answer the producers' expectation?

[Answer] We will retain a very meaningful phrase from your question, i.e., "an important resolution on agriculture."

I believe you answered with these words what we are trying to express. I would like to stress that the resolution on agriculture adopted by the third session of the Central Committee reflects and sincerely expresses the farmers' aspirations as a productive force as well as their aspirations for a true course of action which would guarantee the effective development of the agriculture sector.

Furthermore, the decisions included in the resolution also reflect, clearly and justly, the thorough mastery and knowledge of the political leadership concerning that sector's problems. They also prove the moral courage of the political leadership which is on the alert and works efficiently for a true development in all domains.

The decisions taken in the agricultural sector are very important and characterized by the scope of the political and practical goals aimed at consolidating the socialist development of agriculture in Algeria according to the spirit of the National Charter. I would like to add here that, during the great rally organized by UNPA on 15 May 1980 in the Palace of Nations to explain these decisions, the producers called them historical achievements which will finally differentiate between past problems, true development and growth pattern. This will occur because these decisions are the result of an overall assessment based on the advices and proposals of the rural masses, according to the democratic principle which the political leadership applies to the solution of problems encountered by the rank and file allowed to give their opinion and to discuss them. I believe that, with that principle, we pair experience with evaluation so that we may later truly "sort out" positive from negative results. Some results must be consolidated. They deserve to be studied further, for they are important and practice has demonstrated their usefulness. Experience shows that other results expand or disappear.

[Question] What did UNPA contribute to that third session? What will it contribute to the next party congress?

[Answer] UNPA contributed adequately to the works of the third session of the Central Committee through the report it gave on the overall assessment of the agricultural situation since 1962.

This report was reviewed among the official documents submitted and presented to the Central Committee. We therefore feel that it was an adequate contribution. Furthermore, it was important because it represented the views of all the farmers as it had been prepared with their participation and contributions.

We also had plenty of time to express and record our opinions and proposals since we began its preparation following the third session of UNPA National Council whose proceedings were inaugurated by our brother, the secretary general of the FLN Party and president of the republic, who gave us the task of drawing up a general evaluation of agricultural problems. We feel that this document which was taken in consideration by the political leadership embodies UNPA's contribution to the works of the third session of the Central Committee. As for the second part of your question concerning UNPA's contribution, we shall contribute to the next FLN congress as militants and producers' representatives.

[Question] What do you expect from this next FLN congress?

[Answer] We expect that the next FLN congress will adopt the national development plan which will undoubtedly allow the country to undergo a complete change and large-scale development in all phases of national economy. As the country's supreme institution, the congress is in a position to adopt all the measures aimed at determining the course to be taken by all the phases of the economic development according to the country's requirements and possibilities.

We hope the congress will be an important "focus of change" and a big step toward the consolidation of the bases of socialist edification aimed at guaranteeing the continuity of the revolution.

[Question] The Central Committee decided to lift some of the restrictions imposed on production, concerning, notably, the environment and marketing in particular. In your opinion, what impact will these measures have on production and the producers?

[Answer] The impact of these measures on production and the producers will depend primarily on an effective and strict implementation. Furthermore, at the production and producers' levels, we deeply resent the environment as an enormous burden. However, the implementation of some practical measures to alleviate these restrictions will help reduce the farmer's dependency on various organizations to which he gave up directing his inquiries. It will also enable him to devote himself fully to his work, finding more time which was often lost in vain searches and contacts, the result of bureaucratic hindrances. Those are neither occasional nor annual restrictions, but daily ones, weighing on the farmer's work, this very fact suggesting the need to liberate him from them. Once this is done, he will be able to assume his responsibilities and take initiatives, providing they are part of a clearly planned and coordinated trend.

As for marketing, it cannot be dissociated from the environment. It will be subjected to practical methods which will enable the producer to know his production in a context which will reflect his effort and energy. It will also enable him to benefit from the measures to be implemented in the interest and service of all, that is to say, on behalf of both the producer and consumer.

[Question] However, the question of implementation arises. How do you perceive it?

[Answer] We are considering implementing these measures with methods and structures which will be part of determined stages or which will be different by distinguishing between what is important and what is not. There are urgent measures as stressed by the resolution and measures we could describe as long- and middle-term.

We believe these decisions are divided into three phases or parts:

legislative, which naturally fall within the legislative branch as stated by the Central Committee;

those which will be implemented through orders and decrees; and

those which will be implemented through directives and circulars.

With this method, we will be able to implement progressively and thoroughly the decisions of the third session. As I have already mentioned, we will do so according to priorities aimed at eliminating all the obstacles which hinder the producer in his work and discharge of his duties and, in turn, bring about a decline in efforts, productivity and volume of production.

By broadening this outlook, we will be able to know what other factors are needed to go on to the other measures mentioned in the resolution on agriculture.

[Question] Now on the organic level. The Central Committee set up suitable structures to implement rapidly and definitely the unification of the representation of the agricultural sector up to the different elements within UNPA. What results do you expect from this provision?

[Answer] We are not expecting results as you have indicated it, but we believe that, as a decision maker, the Central Committee saw that this provision was part of the organization's implementation and achievement in the agricultural sector. Consequently, it decided to unify representation in the agricultural sector within all its UNPA elements.

6857

CSO: 4400

RECENT CLASHES IN TEHRAN A PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Jun 80 p 5

[Article by Eric Rouleau: "Violent Clashes in Tehran Between Mujaheddin and Religious Extremists Increase Threat of Civil War"]

[Text] Violent clashes in Tehran between rival political groups on Thursday, 12 June 1980 left at least one dead and approximately 600 injured, 13 shot. At the same time, a communique from the military court revealed that a "counterrevolutionary network of officers" based in Piranshahr, Kurdistan, near the Iraqi border, had been dismantled. The 11 conspirators wanted, according to the authorities, "to reestablish the monarchy, return the shah to power and bring the former prime minister, Mr Shapur Bakhtiar, back to the country." Finally, Teheran accused the Iraqis of beating and jailing two diplomats expelled from Baghdad in retaliation for Iran's declaring two Iraqi diplomats persona non grata.

Tehran--The violent clashes in Tehran reflect the climate of civil war which has become increasingly likely in Iran in the past few weeks. Sabotage, kidnappings, hostage-taking, attacks, assassination attempts multiply from one end of the country to the other, and no one is even able to count them. The purpose of the popular assembly which the people's Mujaheddin, the Moslem leftist movement, held Thursday afternoon was precisely to protest the attacks against their buildings and their militants in recent days.

The riot broke out around 1600 hours near the Amjadieh stadium, 1 hour before the reunion began. Some tens of thousands of party sympathizers stood in line in front of the doors of the enclosure--where the helicopters of the aborted American raid were to land on 25 April--when shouting Hizb Illahi (Party of God) groups started to demonstrate against the Mujaheddin. "Down with the deviationists," they cried, "death to Massoud Rajavi!" (the Mujaheddin leader). "There is only one party, that of God, and one leader, Imam Khomeyni."

Indeed, the Hizb Illahi do not claim to be any precise political grouping. However, it is well known that these shock troops--recruited in Tehran's

slums among the unemployed and the thugs--are the instrument of one extreme-right PRI [Islamic Republican Party] faction, headed by Ayatollah Beheshti. The Mujaheddin's main organ insinuated this week that he is the secret head of these "professional rioters."

The Hizb Illahi attempted to prevent the meeting from being held. In successive waves, they attacked the entrances to the stadium, throwing paving stones and rocks at the law enforcement forces and the thousands of young militants who, in closed ranks, raised their clasped hands to protect themselves from the rain of projectiles. An unusual thing occurred: the police forces and the guardians of the revolution (the Islamic militias) for once maintained apparent neutrality. They did not assist the attackers, certainly, but they protected them from the Mujaheddin militiamen who were 10, 20 times more numerous. The law enforcement forces limited themselves to separating those fighting, releasing tear gas and shooting into the air.

"We Will Continue the Struggle"

The reaction of the people who came to attend the meeting was astonishing and impressive: While the scuffles continued and the deafening machinegun firing intensified, women, men and children advanced in single file, imperturbably, calmly and in a disciplined manner toward the entrance gate. Their faces were tense, their jaws clenched but no one responded to the Hizb Illahi's heckling or the shower of stones. Some even pretended to read a newspaper or pamphlet attentatively.

The composure of the Mujaheddin and their sympathizers paid off. The stadium filled up progressively. In 2 hours, some 150,000 people were seated in the stands and the playing field to listen to Mr Massoud Rajavi. "What should we do?" was both the title and the theme of the progressive Moslem leader's speech. He mentioned the attack which cost the lives of about ten Mujaheddin recently. A cry rose from the crowd. "My brother was killed the day before yesterday!" screamed a sobbing young woman in Western dress. A woman, her head covered in the black chador, harangued the crowd: "We were not afraid of the shah or his prisons. We will not be afraid of anything or anyone." The crowd shouted earnestly: "We will continue the struggle."

"Yes," continued Mr Rajavi, "the fight will continue until victory is achieved, whatever the number of our martyrs." The thirtyish speaker who looks like a young prime minister subdued the crowd: "Why are we criticized? we are good Moslems and we live, we are told, in a Moslem Republic. But they unleash hooligans and terrorists against us. The Islamic Constitution in principle guarantees all freedoms. We are not permitted to have access to the newspapers, radio, television and parliament. The laws provide for the equality of ethnic groups, but the Kurds and other minorities are prevented from obtaining justice and freedom, their claims are drowned in blood."

Outside, the battle raged: explosions, machinegun bursts, ambulance sirens occasionally muffling the speaker's voice. Clouds of bitter, blackish smoke

spread over the stadium, but the people there, still as a block of granite, listened in silence and answered Mr Rajavi punctually, like antique choruses. "La Illah Illalah," (There is no God but God) chanted the crowd fervently.

"Are you listening?" continued the Mujaheddin leader, this time speaking to the Hizb Illahi, "we are neither communists nor pro-Soviets, as you claim. We are fighting for freedom and the total independence of Iran. You are the Moslem reactionaries who, under the cover of your accusations against us, attempt to serve western imperialism. Have we not heard you say that you prefer a thousand times the Shah's government to that of a progressive republic, even if it is Moslem?"

Outburst of Passions

"What are we going to do?" repeated the leader. "The members of the Revolutionary Council, the committee heads and the Islamic militias, ministers, members of parliament keep silent, turn away and allow these 'bands of bums' to attack the people." "Let the Pontius Pilates be warned that if they do not end the terrorism, the Mujaheddin, who have the means, will do it themselves," he added. "Let the honest leaders of the republic not have any illusions: After the Mujaheddin, it will be their turn, that of the Islamic Revolution itself." "Freedom," then cried Mr Rajavi, applauded by the standing crowd, "is not granted, it is conquered. A gift of God, it is as indispensable as oxygen is to the survival of the human race!"

The meeting ended, but the fighting continued near the stadium. The Mujaheddin counterattacked, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guards pushed them back. There was shooting from the roofs of nearby houses. Inanimate bodies lay on the sidewalks. Young people with blood on their faces ran in all directions.

Mr Massoud Rajavi and most leftist leaders expected continued violence and did not sleep at home that night. For some time, the Mujaheddin leader has been leading a semi-clandestine life and has not gone to his party headquarters. He is convinced, just as President Bani-Sadr is, with whom he maintains cordial relations, that the Islamic Republican Party intends to monopolize power. The attack by the Hizb Illahi on leftist students in late April left about 100 dead at the universities. A new offensive, called "cultural revolution" which was expected to be like the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre, was scheduled for 5 June 1980. But the "plot" was exposed at the last moment by the head of state who gave Iman Khomeyni "specific proof"--such as a taped conversation between two PRI leaders--of the criminal intentions of his political adversaries.

The outburst of passions is caused, among other things, by the economic and social crisis and the contradictions within a country that is not governed. The recourse to violence aims to end quickly the powers of the provisional government. Indeed, since the constitution has been approved and parliament elected, the only thing that remains is the formation of the first appointed

government of the Islamic Republic which will give it, it is hoped, at least a stable appearance and composition.

According to the legislation in effect, President Bani-Sadr must name the first prime minister who would then present his government for the approval of the national assembly. However, the Islamic Republican Party, which has the majority both in the Revolutionary Council and in parliament, intends to select the next head of government. The president of the republic is resisting by depending indirectly on leftist groups in the opposition and emphasizing his constitutional prerogatives while attacks are increasing against the Mujaheddin, the Fedayin and other progressive parties.

Mr Bani-Sadr was prepared to name Mr Ali Nobari, governor of the central bank, or Mr Ahmed Salamatian, deputy from Esfahan, to head the new government. Then, faced with the stubborn opposition of his adversaries, he proposed Mr Hassan Habibi, a member of the Revolutionary Council who should theoretically be acceptable to them. But Ayatollah Beheshti's group does not want to talk about compromise. "The next minister must be completely compatible, under our party's leadership," stated the PRI secretary general, Dr Ayat, to "LE MATIN" special correspondent 2 days ago.

This is where the situation stands. According to some observers, the choice is between conciliation and civil war.

9479

CSO: 4900

INDUSTRY MINISTER OFFERS PROJECTS DURING SWEDEN VISIT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Jun 80 p 14

[Article by Bjorn Lindahl, journalist: "Subway, Dams or Cement...the Minister of Industry of Iraq Offers Gigantic Projects"]

[Text] Closely following the Mexican President the really big customer has come to Sweden on a discreet visit. He is Taher Tawfic, the minister of industry of Iraq.

Swedish trade with Iraq has expanded at an unprecedented pace. In 1978 Iraq imported goods amounting to approximately 650 million Swedish crowns. During 1979 this figure doubled to 1,370 million crowns.

"We expect trade during 1980 to exceed 2,000 million crowns," says Taher Tawfic.

This means that Iraq is Sweden's second largest customer among the developing countries. Only Saudi Arabia is larger. Iraq is the largest foreign market for Saab-Scania.

"Here in Sweden we are particularly interested in the auto, steel, paper, and cement industry," says Taher Tawfic. During Thursday, the Iraqi trade delegation visited Volvo, Saab-Scania and SKF-engineering. Other industrial corporations that have been contacted include, i.e., the Euro-group and LKAB.

Cement Shortage

As an example of the rapid growth, Tawfic mentions the cement industry. Today, in Iraq, 6.5 million tons are being produced annually and a further 3 million tons are being imported. But 11.5 million tons are needed.

"At the turn of the year 1982/83 we would like to have a capacity of our own of 17 million tons. To achieve this we will have to construct five new cement factories. Swedish corporations are welcome to construct complete factories or parts of them," says Tawfic.

The Minister of Industry of Iraq raises an outstretched hand and offers in addition some further gigantic projects to be realized during the next 5-year plan: Baghdad will get a subway and enormous dams and water reservoirs for artificial irrigation are to be built.

"I very much regret that a greater number of Swedish corporations have not set up their business in Iraq. If that had been the case it would be much easier to do business with them" complains Tawfic. Also, regrettably the Swedish corporations often give higher price quotations than their foreign competitors.

During the Saturday Taher Tawfic met with Nils G. Asling and on this occasion the two ministers of industry further reaffirmed the importance of good trade relations between the two countries.

One reason why Iraq is so anxious to do business with Sweden is our neutrality. Iraq is located in what might be the most unstable area in the world, with Iran, an old enemy, on one side and the occupied Afghanistan not far away.

"Even if we count ourselves among the friends of the Soviet Union, we cannot ignore the aggression this innocent and poor country has been exposed to. We have a feeling that we could be next on the list. But it should not be forgotten that the marching in of the Soviet Union has provided the United States with an excuse to pretend that they have an interest in the Arabic Gulf comparable to that being a state like Florida," says Tawfic.

"But we will defend ourselves and I promise that we, having enormous supplies of oil, will be one of the two countries producing the last barrel of oil in a distant future. We will always have a lot of money and we spend it all--we have no large bank accounts around the world but instead use the money to develop our country."

9608

CSO: 3109

UNITED NATIONS FORCES FACE TROUBLE IN SOUTH

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5-11 May 80 pp 19-21

/Article: "Lebanon: the Dilemma of the United Nations in the South"/

/Text/ If the recent developments in the south of Lebanon revealed once again the dilemma of the Lebanese government, and its inability to adopt any effective steps to defend the south and protect it from the Israeli danger, they have also revealed the United Nations' dilemma in the face of the increasing challenges the international forces concentrated in the south are facing. These not only prevent them from carrying out their missions but also face them with real direct dangers. Therefore, the international Security Council discussions on the new Israeli violation of Lebanese territory have concentrated on the nature of the United Nations forces' task, the circumstances of their activity, their opportunities for movement and the obstacles in their way. The council paused before a bitter fact, which is that the international forces, in their current condition, are incapable of performing their basic tasks, which consist of preventing Israeli violations of the territory of the south and protecting the inhabitants of the southern villages from the aggressions of Sa'd Haddad's militia, which have recently escalated gravely--a matter which causes one to fear that numerous countries have resolved to withdraw their forces from the south, out of anxiety for the safety of their members, who are falling one after the other without their sacrifices achieving any results.

In the Lebanese, Arab-wide and international contexts, it is agreed that the real problem facing the United Nations, in addition to Lebanon is Sa'd's militia, which Israel is using as a spearhead inside Lebanese territory to threaten the southern villages, commit aggression against them and take revenge against defenseless inhabitants who refuse to be used as tools in the Israeli scheme. Sa'd Haddad admitted to one of his visitors and intimates that he was carrying out Israeli instructions completely and had no power over matters--he existed thanks to Israeli support, which covered material requirements, weapons, ammunition, and all the activities dictated by armed combat in southern territory. He also admitted that in the end he will come to a dead end, because the unnatural situation

prevailing along Lebanon's southern borders will not continue indefinitely, and he will be the first victim in any settlement Israel accepts. Nonetheless, Haddad added, he can no longer retreat, now that he has become greatly implicated in relations with Israel and has also lost all legitimacy within the Lebanese army; he is no longer anticipating any solution through which he can regain this legitimacy.

Diplomatic sources state that the recent events which southern Lebanon has witnessed have gone beyond the traditional scope of daily military operations and have turned into a direct military aggression against the international forces in general and the Irish forces in particular, motivated by Israel's desire to exact revenge against the latter, having considered them responsible for the infiltration of the guerrilla group which carried out the Nitzavim operation in occupied Palestine (although this is not proved and there is no evidence for it). The objective of the Israeli force which entered Lebanese territories in the wake of the Arab Liberation Front operation was to facilitate the revenge strike directed against the international forces on the one hand and to divert attention from the special operation which the enemy forces subsequently carried out in the 'Adun coastal region. Similarly, Israel showed that it is able to avenge itself, not just against the Palestine resistance, not just against Lebanese targets, but also against the United Nations. This is something that has happened for the first time on such a broad, open scale, in which Israel, with thousands of examples recorded against it in the past 32 years, has gone beyond the limits of violating international resolutions and United Nations legitimacy, and has shifted to the use of military force against the international forces, challenging the international organization and the countries to which these forces belong.

These sources go on to say that the most serious thing the latest confrontation in the south has revealed is the role Sa'd Haddad's militia play as a military arm of the Israeli army in southern Lebanon; the responsibility disappears between Israel, which hides behind Haddad, and Haddad himself, who acts as if he was outside all law, including international law.

What is the international solution to this perverse situation?

The international Security Council discussions have made it apparent that the United Nations is unable to take a decisive stand to confront this problem for two reasons. First is the American insistence on postponing any attempt to punish Israel or adopt any negative measure against it, and second is the existence of a dichotomy between Israel's responsibility and that of Sa'd Haddad, although Israeli officials frankly admit to supporting Haddad and offering him various forms of assistance. The conclusion which Lebanon's representative in the United Nations--and also the representatives of a number of countries belonging to the international organization--reached is that it is "necessary to spread out uncircumscribed international forces up to the southern borders and give clear, specific

orders which will permit these forces to use the power they have, which has been placed at their disposal, not just to protect their security and safety but also to confront all those who use force against them, condemn the Israeli aggression, withdraw the Israeli army from the south at once, and dissolve and disarm Sa'd Haddad's forces." The Lebanese delegate also called for "provision of means for the international forces to carry out the task the Security Council assigned it to carry out, as well as revival of its appropriate structure and powers, especially the international observer force, as the sole effective guarantee for bringing security onto the southern Lebanese borders, especially if they are guaranteed by a military deterrent force of international forces."

From this it is clear that Lebanon, as well as the United Nations, has got to the essence of this complex problem; it has by now been proved that everyone is refraining from describing the beneficial remedy even as they properly diagnose the disease. There is a consensus that Sa'd Haddad's militia is what is working to cause the situation in the south to explode (under provocation from Israel), in order to put pressure on Lebanon to liquidate the Palestinian resistance on the one hand and keep the gateway to the south open to the Israeli army on the other, to tactical military intervention or permanent expansionist occupation. Haddad's militia has lately started to behave as if it were a unit of the Israeli army, at a time when Haddad is claiming to the world that he is fighting to defend Lebanon's sovereignty. The situation has brought him to the point where he asked the Irish forces operating as part of the international forces to withdraw from the position in which they were concentrated, especially the municipality of al-Tiri. What is odd in the situation is that this demand was conveyed by the Israeli foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir to the Irish ambassador in Israel; this ambassador rejected the demand and replied, "It would be more reasonable for Maj Haddad to move his forces, because they have no legal status."

As the International Security Council was continuing its discussions on the situation prevalent in southern Lebanon, without reaching a decision on decisively confronting the challenges which Israel was exerting, through Sa'd Haddad, Haddad's militia was upping its aggressions against the international forces, attacking an international observers' position in Marujin and Tadmarah, after stripping it of its contents, and carrying out its threat to bomb the municipality of al-Tiri in order to compel the Irish forces to withdraw from it. This aggression resulted in the killing of the two Irish soldiers.

Diplomatic sources have stated that this military setup is aimed at two things: first, at compelling the Irish force to withdraw, "as discipline," as a result of the charge leveled against it of facilitating the passage of guerrillas to the Misgav Am settlement, and second, to put pressure on the International Security Council so that it will avoid adopting a decisive decision against Haddad's militia and also officially announce the withdrawal of the Irish force from southern Lebanon but only after this

declaration has been issued by the Israeli government. The United Nations refused to issue this declaration on Israel's word, out of fear that it would be false; in exchange, it stipulated that its forces be permitted to spread out up to the border strip in order to reassure itself of the correctness of Israeli intentions. However, Israel rejected this and prompted Haddad to launch new aggressions against the international forces.

What draws one's attention is the fact that the United States of America, which had undertaken to put pressure on Israel to stop its aggressions against the international forces and refrain from escalating the military situation, at the same time acted to prevent the Security Council from adopting a resolution condemning the latest Israeli aggression and threatened to use the right of the veto against any resolution in this regard. This delayed all international attempts to produce a decisive stand vis-a-vis the continuous aggressions to which the United Nations forces have been exposed.

Diplomatic sources expected that Sa'd Haddad would continue to express his hostility toward the international forces, whenever these forces seemed to insist on performing their requisite task and whenever Israel felt increased world pressure on it and increased scope for support for the Palestinian cause. It is necessary, as these sources stress, that an international resolution be adopted to restrict Haddad's influence by subjecting the areas he now dominates to surveillance and dominance by the international forces, which will prevent Israel from using this card forcefully.

A Positive Step

Lebanon took a positive step in this direction when the army commander, Gen Victor Khuri, sent a letter to the commander of the international forces in the south, Gen Emmanuel Erskine, reviewing the status of the Lebanese battalion now present in the operations area of the international forces, which is at the international command's disposal for use in the process of imposing peace on the area, that is, in helping to repel aggressions by Haddad's militia. This issue has become more urgent since the scope of international forces control was to be expanded to the border strip, because this step was to have been taken by a military force, and it is natural, indeed essential, that Lebanon's participation in that force be major, not secondary or nominal. To this end, diplomatic sources consider that Lebanon, the party with prime responsibility and interest in restoring security and stability to the south, should offer more military support to the international forces so that it may be possible to resolve the problem quickly. These sources go on to say that for domestic and foreign reasons Lebanon is not able to perform this task alone, but the matter changes when the task is performed under an international cover represented by the Security Council and the international forces posted in the south. Diplomatic sources say that this is possible from the military standpoint, since the Security Council has approved the creation of

modifications in the status of the international forces and has prepared them with the means to enable them to complete the process of spreading out to the occupied Palestine borders. In such a case Israel's resistance to the international forces in direct, open form is to be ruled out because, so far, in all the military operations taken in the area, including long-range artillery bombardment, it has hidden behind Sa'd Haddad and his militia. It is expected that this development will result in relief on the international level, especially now that Israel has launched its latest aggression against the Lebanese coastal area of 'Adlun, which led to the loss of many victims.

However, Lebanon must not remain alone in this joint confrontation of international and domestic dimensions; all Arab states must stand by it. The Lebanese government has realized the importance of this issue and has tried to mobilize Arab diplomacy by various means. It is not desirable that the Arab countries provide military aid as long as the confrontation now underway is between Israel and the United Nations and as long as the Arab-Israeli military confrontation entails other considerations which are not being raised now. Thus what is desired is for a comprehensive Arab movement to take place on the international level, which is the least hope for having every country use the influence it has to put pressure on the European countries, and the United States in particular, to make them adopt an effective position which the United Nations will adopt against Israel and its military instruments inside Lebanese territory. It is natural that the countries contributing to the international forces take a position in support of these efforts, since their soldiers are exposed to repeated Israeli aggressions; these have led to the death and injury of dozens of soldiers so far. As a result, each of these countries will consider itself directly concerned in this matter and will try to obtain international guarantees to protect the lives of its troops at least.

America As Always!

Although the entire international situation does not now seem beneficial to Israel, in view of the continuous challenges and aggressions the United Nations forces are facing in southern Lebanon, observers do not believe that it is possible to bend the American position to gravitate toward condemnation of the Israeli position, reduction of the influence of Sa'd Haddad's militia, and empowerment of the international forces to confront the challenges to which they are exposed, because of the American presidential elections and American president Carter's anxiety to court the instruments of Jewish pressure in the United States and consequently satisfy Israel, which has recently increased its rigidity toward any just settlement of the Palestinian cause. Proceeding from this, Washington has tried to draw up an equation between the aggressions Israel and Sa'd Haddad's militia are committing in southern Lebanon and the latest guerrilla operation in Misgav Am and armed Palestinian activity in general. Although this is not strange in terms of American policy toward the Arab-Israeli

struggle, it contradicts the United States' commitments to Lebanon, and others besides Lebanon, of intervening with Israel to prevent escalation of military confrontation on Lebanese soil. As it appears, Washington is content with what the international forces are facing in southern Lebanon, whatever the calculations and premises it proceeds from.

Observers express fear that American-Israeli pressure will lead to an opening of the file on the Palestinians in Lebanon; the Lebanese authorities are trying to avoid this by every means. Israel is trying to cope with the dilemma it is facing in the autonomy negotiations by stirring up and drawing some Palestinians to the negotiating table. In spite of the observations some American circles are expressing on the Israeli position regarding the autonomy negotiations, the general political line which President Carter's administration backs is based on support for the Israeli position whatever its contents and objectives might be. The Lebanese government received international and Arab advice to avoid opening the file on the Palestinians because that would lead to serious complications domestically, in the Arab context, and internationally, as Lebanon has come to understand well. There is nothing to indicate that the Lebanese authorities intend to open the dossier on the Palestinians because that would disrupt movements toward reconciliation among Lebanese parties on the one hand and give Israel justification to escalate its military activities in the south on the other. As contrasted to that, the Lebanese authorities are trying to remedy Lebanese-Palestinian relations with the utmost calm, so that they will remain within controllable limits by both parties. The Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue began with the meeting held between President Ilyas Sarkis and Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) in addition to the removed contacts, far from the limelight, between the PATH organization and some parties to the Maronite "Lebanese Front."

Political sources state that Lebanon might resume reviving the memorandum it presented to the United Nations in January last year containing a plan for military dispersal up to the border strip, beginning with a first stage which would include the return of two villages which Sa'd Haddad's militia occupied last year to the international forces in exchange for which the Lebanese government would implement a plan to bring the army into the town of Sur. These sources add that the Lebanese government is determined to carry out this step, whether the United Nations takes the initiative to do so or not, because Lebanon is now in pressing need of a card it can plan to put pressure on the various parties concerned with the crisis in the south shortly before the date of termination of the current extension period for the international peacekeeping forces in the south on 19 June. Lebanese officials now feel that the Lebanese authorities will face a new dilemma if they are not able to present a positive alternative in the south before this period because many of the countries contributing to the international forces are no longer enthusiastic about continuing their contribution if the current situation in southern Lebanon continues and their troops continue to receive blows without even being able to defend themselves. Therefore the Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue is

occurring as an essential step in the context of efforts aimed at setting forth a joint plan to guarantee the restoration of Lebanese legitimacy to the south and paving the way for legitimate Lebanese and international forces to spread out up to the border strip and end the Na'd Haddad saga. This could have occurred in the framework of the agreements concluded between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine Liberation Organization--agreements to which both sides are adhering, as stated in the letter of conciliation which President Ilyas Sarkis recently sent to the Lebanese and as had formerly been vouched for at the latest Arab Summit in Tunis.

Diplomatic sources stress that the sole basic card which Lebanon must play is its adherence to the truce agreement concluded between it and Israel in 1948, so that it may continue to act within the context of international legitimacy. This is because breaking this agreement will give Israel room to move across the southern borders at will and this, with time, will lead to the creation of a new fait accompli resembling a permanent occupation in its ramifications and effects. Now, though, can Lebanon exercise this natural right at a time when it is not able to send its forces to the international borders and deal with the Israeli enemy in accordance with the content of the truce agreement? This, in reality, is the main obstacle. If the various parties concerned do not respond to the Lebanese authorities to reach this goal, the fears some are expressing that the problem of the south will remain as it is will ultimately lead to success of the settlement plot. These are legitimate fears and objective reasons can be found for them in everything happening in this part of Lebanon now. It is no longer a secret to anyone that Israel is pushing the crisis in this direction, and its rigidity in the autonomy negotiations are not the only proof of the validity of this.

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CSO: 4802

INTERNECINE STRIFE FLARES WITHIN CHRISTIAN RIGHT

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19-25 May 80 p 21

/Article: "War Flares up between the Phalange's 'Frogs' and the Liberals' 'Tigers'"

/Text/ Will the situation in Lebanon explode again in a manner encompassing all areas?

This question has reasserted itself urgently in the past few days and will dominate officials' concerns following the resumption of bloody skirmishes in both the southern outskirts of Beirut, where suspicious hands are actively aggravating conditions whenever they quiet down, and in the eastern areas, stretching from the Ba'abda area to the Kasrawan coast, where the Phalange and Liberal Nationalists' Parties are competing for influence, paying no attention to repeated appeals which the leaders of the two parties, Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayyel, are making while warning of the consequences of continued fighting.

Shaykh Pierre Gemayel, head of the Phalange War Council and commander of the right-wing militia known as the "Lebanese Forces," admitted in one of his recent speeches, while calling for the members of the two parties to rise above trivia and foolishness and rise to the level of the battle of destiny Lebanon has joined, that the cause of the disputes between the Phalangists and the Liberal Nationalists was competition over the imposition of fraternity and mediation.

There is a long story to the outbreak of the dispute between the Phalange and the Liberals in the Kasrawan coast, and it would not be harmful to review this, now that it has become the talk of clubs and salons. The Phalange Party had previously established the "frog" team, for which it selected a training activity area along the sea in Jabal al-Dib around which armed Phalangists set up a zone to prevent citizens from going by or approaching the area. It was natural that the Liberal Nationalists should emulate their "allies" and set up a school for frogman, where training started in diving activities, in the Aquamarina area situated in the municipality of Tabarja near the town of Juniyah.

The competition between the Phalange's "frogs" and the Liberals' "tigers" reached its peak, especially in the realm of piracy, which reached its climax in the past 3 months, when protests by shipping company owners, merchants and importers arose as the government was not able to intervene when the Phalange and Liberal militia dominated the "free ports" stretching along the coast in the Kasrawan area.

Thus the struggle between the parties' "frogs" moved from sea to land and bloody skirmishes took place in al-Safra, Tabarja, Fatqa, and Kafr Yasin. It would have enveloped the whole Kasrawan area had it not been for concentrated efforts President Camille Chamoun and Shaykh Pierre Gemayel exerted, in cooperation with the people of the region who raised a cry over the perverse procedures the party members were carrying out every day, which ended with the death of innocent victims.

AL-DUSTUR can stress that fire still is under the ashes on the Kasrawan coast and that the situation cannot return to normal there unless the two parties pave the way for the entry of the army, so that the latter can take charge of supervising security, as it did in the Furn al-Shabbak-'Ayn al-Kummanah area, when it succeeded in establishing its presence.

11887

CSO: 4802

LEBANON

BRIEFS

ARMY WEAPONS DEALS--Political circles are observing steps to reconstruct the Lebanese army, whose number is to rise to 18,000, with interest. In the fiscal 1980 budget, the American Government has allocated \$32.5 million to finance sales of American weapons to Lebanon to complete the \$100 million program to rebuild the Lebanese armed forces. It is understood that Lebanon is now using American credits to obtain various items of equipment, including 43 M-113A1 type armored troop transport vehicles, 100 M109 trucks, and 100 12.7 millimeter Browning M-2 machine guns as well as a number of rifles, light weapons and communications systems. It is being stated that France has provided close to \$250 million to finance Lebanon's acquisition of Gazelle and Bouma helicopters, tanks, and missile boats and that Lebanon has asked for 200 anti-tank missiles of the French-German Milan class and 18 launchers. A Lebanese delegation recently visited Romania to complete an agreement on acquiring 10,000 anti-tank missiles (RPC's) and 400 launchers. /Text/ /Beirut AL-DIFA' AL-'ARABI in Arabic May 80 p 8/

GRADUATION OF TRAINEES--So far 10,000 soldier recruits have graduated in the Lebanese Army and have been distributed among all units in the military organization. Every year 3,000 recruits graduate; they constitute the backbone of the army. The recruit training camp in al-Payyadiyah receives the new volunteers, provides them with basic training and supplementary training in various areas of specialization, and subjects them to intensified diversified training programs to help them shift from civilian life to various aspects of military life, so that they become qualified to perform the military assignments entrusted to them. /Text/ /Beirut AL-DIFA' AL-'ARABI in Arabic May 80 p 9/ 11887

C90: 4802

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEPENDS ON FINDING ADDITIONAL WATER

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 6 Jun 80 pp 3, 8

[Text] Since the dawn of civilizations, populations, becoming more and more numerous, have been able to live and develop their activities only by triumphing over the restrictions imposed by their natural environment, particularly as regards to the volume and distribution of water resources.

In the Sahel the climate has undergone a generalized disturbance since 1969 the scope and effects of which are jeopardizing the development of the regions concerned.

Demographic growth, the installation of industrial units, and the necessity of developing the rural sector, an essential and determining element for the survival of our populations and the improvement of their living conditions requires the actual mastery of water.

The desired results will be achieved only if we succeed in integrating our hydraulic system with a general policy bypassing major constraints and critical obstacles.

In this article we will try, to the extent possible, to highlight water policy in Mauritania of unblocking the major constraints which impede the mastery of this resource unlike the others.

In Mauritania, as in all countries, water controls nature and the life of man. Demand grows rapidly and needs are manifested at all levels.

These needs differ according to branches of consumption:

Thus we distinguish the needs of the industrial and mining sector, the needs of the rural sector, and human consumption.

The Mining and Industrial Sector

This sector is consuming an increasingly large amount of water. The Nouadhibou oil refinery which will soon start up has an annual consumption of 750 cm³/day, or 273,750 cm³/year. The explosive plant designed to satisfy the demands of COMINOR [Northern Mining Complex] requires 110 cm³/day or 40,150 cm³/year. The electric generating plant at Nouadhibou uses 40 cm³/day, and the Nouakchott sugar refinery, which has not yet started up, needs 400 cm³/day, or 140,000 cm³/year.

From the mining point of view, exploitation of the copper of Akjoujt requires a consumption of 2,200,000 cm³/year while that of iron requires 2,500,000 cm³/year.

In this field the demand for water will show a large increase with the completion of the cement plant projects, the Guelbs, the port construction, etc....

While the mining and industrial sector require increasingly large quantities of water, the towns of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, main towns of the country, are beginning to be industrialized. The demographic increase witnessed by these two towns, accentuated by a forced rural exodus and the large number of industrial projects is causing the demand for water in these two towns to rise appreciably.

The results of the supplementary studies of the Boulanouar aquifer which supplies the economic capital show that the 1981 needs will be satisfied by the aquifer. As for Nouakchott, the transportation of water from Idini can no longer satisfy demand and this is the reason why efforts are being undertaken from now on to find a definitive solution to this problem...

Rural Sector

Dry agriculture normally supplies the bulk of our food production. Considering the climatic fluctuations, the national leaders are trying to move up the development of intensive irrigation. The areas presently cultivated by irrigation require a water consumption of about 80,000,000 cm³/year.

For stock raising water consumption is estimated at 45,000,000 cm³/year.

Human Hydraulics

The population of our country is estimated at 1,328,700. Considering that 80 percent of this population is basically rural, we will have an

annual water consumption of 7,759,608 cm³, or a daily consumption of 20 liters. For the urban centers, which comprise 20 percent, we will need 4,849,755 cm³/year, or a daily consumption of 50 liters per inhabitant. Thus the population of our country consumes a total of 12,609,363 cm³/year. But while the demand for water is growing ever larger, there are diverse hydraulic resources: both subterranean and surface waters.

Subterranean waters are comprised of aquifers the supply and size of which vary. In this context we can cite shallow surface aquifers which result from runoff into the dune hollows and into the alluvial formations. These aquifers are very numerous, but their hydraulic interest depends on the amount of rainfall. The total flow of these aquifers is estimated at 25,000 cm³/day.

The generalized aquifers from 10 to 100 meters deep occupy vast areas. Their productivity is linked to the nature of the stratum. They have a flow of 50,000 cm³/year.

There are also aquifers of dune sand, the permanent level of which lies at an average depth of 30 meters and which supply flows of 50 cm³/hour.

There are still other aquifers which comprise important reserves of water.

Surface Waters

The rains in Mauritania are characterized by their irregularity in time and their localization in space. They fall in general from June to October. The amount of rainfall with us is about 100 millimeters per year. The water distribution network is weak due to the fact that the largest wadis empty into closed basins. Only the basin downstream from Karakoro and the western zone of the Assaba possess wadis with at least a temporary flow over their whole course before emptying into the Senegal River.

Bodies of water are extremely rare: R'Kiz Lake occupies the bottom of the depression of the Aftout Chargui and is filled only by diversion of the floodwaters of the Senegal River. The Lake of Aleg is a depression where the waters of the Oued (Wadi) Ketchi end up during the winter season. The Lake of Mal is of the same type. Other smaller ponds or abandoned river channels (backwater subject to flooding in the rainy season) are the only important bodies of water.

The Senegal River constitutes an important source of water because the planned river control projects will make it possible to irrigate more than 430,000 hectares with a flow of 300 to 700 cm³/a second.

This means that rural development requires a supply of water of quality and quantity sufficient not only for animals and crops, but also for man, his health and well-being. For stockraising the choice of works to utilize the aquifers should be made so as to avoid overloading the pastures.

To raise agricultural production it is imperative to evaluate the percentage of arable land and to institute a better utilization of water.

In the supply sector one comes up against problems due on the one hand to confusion relating to the quantity of water for the inhabitants and for economic projects, and on the other hand to the use of this water in the urban zone, where it is wasted and in the peripheral or rural zone, where it remains insufficient.

6108

CSO: 4400

POWER STRUGGLE IN SOUTH ENDS WITH ALIER ON TOP

Political Impasse Broken

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jun 80 pp 10-11, 15

[Text]

For the second time since the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, Abel Alier takes over the Presidency of the High Executive Council - the government of the Southern Region. But, even up to the last minute, it was never sure in whom the newly-elected Regional Assembly would place its trust to take command of the government, break the political impasse of the past two years and spark the Southern economy back to life.

Sudanow Regional Editor Jacob Akol was in Juba last month and filed the following account of the election struggle:

THE POWER STRUGGLE in the Southern Region continued right up until the very end. Even into the final stages, it was believed that Mr Samuel Aru would give up his attempt to gain the Regional presidency in favour of Vice-President Abel Alier. But then came the late announcement that former-President Joseph Lagu was giving up his attempt to regain the crown he was forced to surrender in February, and was putting all his weight behind Samuel Aru.

With no other new developments until the very day of the elections and with all attempts at reconciling the groups having failed, the decision was literally put in the hands of the newly-elected Regional Assembly. Unlike two years ago, when Alier was advised by President Nimeiri to step down so that the SSU Assembly could recommend Lagu for the Presidency of the HEC, the Assembly had to make the choice between Vice-President Abel Alier, Hilary Paulo Logali, Samuel Aru, and Peter Gatkuoth.

Hilary Paulo Logali had hoped that in a situation in which neither Alier nor Lagu would be acceptable to the Assembly he could pick up the crown. He still hopes that such a fate will befall both Alier and Aru.

As for Lagu's support for Aru, it looks as firm as it is hollow. Lagu's aim all along has been to prevent Alier from becoming the next President of the HEC; Lagu has now come to believe that his downfall was largely engineered by Alier in his position as Vice-President of the Republic. It has therefore become practical to support Aru, since a serious rift between Alier and Aru seemed to be the next best bet. On this basis it is firm.

It appears hollow because it was only last year that Lagu found it necessary to dismiss Aru as his Vice-President, after the latter was accused of depositing, in his private account, thirty-thousand pounds destined for flood victims in Upper Nile and Bahr el Gazal provinces. Even when an Assembly committee reported

that they found no evidence to support the allegation that Aru intended to use the money for purposes other than that for which it was intended, Lagu set up another investigation committee which reversed the findings of the first. After criminal proceedings against Aru were recommended, Aru was alleged to have written a letter advocating the overthrow of both Lagu's government and the May Revolution. The money accusation was brushed aside as the lesser evil.

It was, therefore, suspected that if--with Lagu's backing--Aru managed to beat Alier, it would be only a matter of time before Lagu's supporters dug up the findings of the second committee from the criminal archives and forced Aru out of office--a not-so-hypothetical proposition.

Vice-President Alier has his handicaps, too. There can be no overlooking the fact that when Lagu came to power two years ago there was a widespread feeling that the preaching of peace and unity, the cornerstone of Alier's seven years in power, had run its course. The cry was, and still is, overwhelmingly, for bread and clean water.

There is also no denying that Alier had solid achievements, which included the resettlement of over half a million refugees, the integration of the former guerrillas into the National Army and, above all, a feeling of security and self-confidence in the region.

It is well and good for Mr Peter Gatkuoth to remind Sudanow that '...the last two years have been bad years for the South, both for the people and the institutions which were set up to help solve the problems of the people.' But when he goes on to say that '...out of a healthy situation, a sick society was developed, the Assembly and everything else deteriorated, and the government did nothing effective. For the last two years there has been no development, no services, only disease, which has been rampaging in the whole of the South,' the only comfort that can be taken is that he does not exclude himself from this indictment. In fact, he readily acknowledges his part in it. Gatkuoth was Alier's Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and Lagu appointed him to the same post in his famous reshuffle over a year ago. He also replaced Aru as Vice-President to Joseph Lagu.

Mr Gatkuoth told Sudanow that if Lagu had abandoned his sectarian attitude as soon as he was appointed President of the High Executive Council and formed a government of reconciliation, which would have included Alier's men, 'we would not have found ourselves in a mess today.' But it was an open secret that Mr Gatkuoth swore never to serve under Joseph Lagu.

As Mr James Tambura explained to Sudanow: 'If I were in the place of Joseph Lagu, and just yesterday I had a tug of war with someone--a war which I won--how could I feel confident that this man would give me his full support if I appointed him to a position of power?'

So when Joseph Lagu speaks bitterly of Alier's intrigues, which, he claims, pushed him out of office, he presumably regards Peter Gatkuoth as the main instrument for that purpose.

Former national Minister of Culture and Information, Bona Malwal, now a member of the SSU Political Bureau, believes that Lagu should have chosen his first government in the spirit of the political movement, which does not encourage sectarian activities. It is on this basis of unity that Malwal has been most active in the attempt to rally support for Alier.

Alier's unbeatable asset, however, remains his incredibly long and good working relationship with President Nimeiri. It is because of this special relationship that the President has been advised to keep well away from the present power struggle in the region. On this point, the Southern leadership is unanimous.

Another point they seem united upon is the threat to peace and order--and perhaps even to the Addis Ababa Agreement itself--caused by the dismal economic and social conditions in the region.

Speaking to Sudanow last month, Bona Malwal, who had just returned from the South after supervising elections there, was full of anxiety: 'Unless we do something spectacular in the way of improving the livelihood of our people, we have a real problem on our hands. People with social and economic disadvantages of such magnitude have nothing to lose. I see the threat to the Addis Ababa Agreement coming from that direction.'

As he presides over the outgoing government, Peter Gatkuoth gives less than half of his attention to the numerous complaints of election rigging; the rest of his time is claimed by gruesome tales of a famine in Eastern Equatoria and the marauding Murle tribesmen in Jonglei Province. Like the Taposae in Kapoeta, the Murle have somehow managed to arm themselves with automatic guns. Recently, the Commissioner of Jonglei province arrived in Juba to demand an army to go and track down the Murle who had raided the Dinka, killing many of them, and driven away an unspecified number of cattle. This sparked off a Dinka attack on the few Murle in Bor, the capital of Jonglei, and put the Commissioner Mr Jonathan Malwal Leek, in a panic: 'The situation is terrible,' was all he could manage to tell Sudanow.

Such is the region the incoming government will inherit. It is a brave new world where 'the mincing of words will not do,' as one Southerner remarked. Said a deputy director with a hearty chuckle: 'You are a poor people,' they tell us, 'and do not live in Europe or America or Nairobi.' It is well to preach the gospel of poverty but, somehow, it doesn't sound right when it comes from a fellow who rides in a Mercedes.'

What Went Wrong

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jun 80 pp 12-13

[Text] Politics in the Southern Region virtually came to halt as the hostility between the Executive and Regional Assembly became more deeply entrenched. In an attempt to break the deadlock, President Nimeiri dissolved the Assembly and called for fresh elections. But now that the elections are over and a new man takes up the post of Southern President, the post mortem begins. Regional Editor Jacob Akol asked leading Southern politicians, "What went wrong?"

Mr Bona Malwal, former national Minister of Culture and Information and member of the Politburo, has spent the last twelve months at Oxford University writing a book. But he has been keeping in touch with developments in the Region and is now very much involved in Regional politics.

'We have to recognise that what we have here is a system of checks and balances. Strictly speaking, I don't think that you can call it a parliamentary system in the sense that a government has to subject itself to a vote of confidence at all times. But, I think it's important to recognise that our system in the Region requires that the Regional Assembly check the work of the Executive branch, and that members of the Executive branch subject themselves to parliamentary questioning.

Where we went wrong is that at that time there were questions raised about members of the Executive, particularly the President of the High Executive Council; and charges that had to do with maladministration, corruption and the mismanagement of public funds had to be cleared.

The President of the High Executive Council should have subjected himself to an investigation to be cleared from these allegations. He thought, and perhaps members of his government thought, that Parliament had no right to question him and, perhaps, thought that he could punish the Assembly or its leaders.

The Executive branch tried to temper the Assembly by dismissing the Speaker, even when regulations for the Regional Assembly do not provide for his dismissal. The Assembly can withdraw confidence from the Speaker, in which case the Speaker would be required to resign out of respect for political institutions. What happened is that when the President of the High Executive Council asked his supporters in the Parliament to withdraw their confidence in the Speaker, he proceeded to dismiss one Speaker and appoint another in his place. I think this was a very blatant act, and that is where we went wrong. I would hope that in future we will ensure that Parliament functions in the way it is supposed to function.'

MR ISBONI MONDIRI is a veteran politician who was signatory to the Addis Ababa Agreement. Two years ago, Lagu appointed him as his adviser.

'I agree with the view that Lagu could have avoided the path he took right from the beginning, if he had recognised that what we have in Sudan is a one-party system, and that after he was unanimously recommended by the Assembly for the Presidency of the High Executive Council he should have formed a government of participation and not chosen his ministers only from those who supported him.

In my capacity as the President's adviser I wrote a report on this and advised him to make a six-man committee, composed of one person from each of the six provinces of the Southern Region to look into this case, and report to him so that he would administer the region on a balanced basis. I asked him to put Mr Phillip Yonna, then leader of the House, in charge. I gave a copy of my report to the President of the High Executive Council - Joseph Lagu - and a copy to Phillip Yonna. Both praised it, but there was no other reaction from either.

I think that what happened over the last two years will be avoided in future.

Both the government and Assembly were not sure what they were after. They were not even paying attention to the laws of Sudan. They did not look at the Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, the Permanent Constitution or the regulations of the Regional Assembly. They were, therefore, bound to make dreadful mistakes. But since

people learn by experience, I think there is little room for the future President of the High Executive Council to make the same mistakes.'

MR PETER GATKUOTH was Regional Minister of Finance and Economic Planning in the last stages of Alier's government. He bowed out of office, together with Alier, when Joseph Lagu assumed the presidency of the High Executive Council in 1978. After Lagu's first reshuffle in 1979, he was appointed Vice-President and Regional Minister of Finance. When Lagu resigned last February, he recommended that Gatkuoth be appointed to head the Regional Government.

'It is generally accepted by all that the last two years have been bad years for the South, both for the people and the institutions which were set up to help solve the problems of the people. For me, the situation which led to the problems in 1978-9 began when we went to the polls in 1978. We had misconceived our grounds. We had forgotten that with the May Revolution we had set up the systems that were supposed to guide us in decision-making. We went to the polls as divided people - one group called 'Abel's group' and another 'Lagu's group'. This very concept was, to me, the cause of the confusion in 1978-79.

This was foreseen by the North, causing President Nimein himself to intervene and ask the Vice-President, Abel Alier, to withdraw from the contest. It was unthinkable that two leaders of the May Revolution should go to a platform

and ask for a mandate when we have other forums where this decision could have been made. By withdrawing Alier from the contest, it was thought that tempers would cool down, a new way of looking at the problems would evolve, and that the new leader was going to demonstrate leadership and try to reunite the South and to forge ahead.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. Instead, there ensued a policy of dividing the South into the existing institutions of the people: the government, the Assembly and the SSU. These institutions were not given ample time to work towards unity or to gear and mobilise the people to the concept of unity, which is the predominant factor in achieving anything for the people.

This was abandoned, and as a result, those who felt they had a right to participation in the development of this land and who wished to contribute effectively to this land became an opposition in the Assembly. This developed a sense of liberal democracy in the Southern people. My own assessment of the situation--in which I was a participant--is that a people with a purpose should learn from history. If you don't recollect and see what has happened, you have nothing to guide you. What has happened should be indicative of what line of action we should take to lead us to a better future. We have learned a lot from the mistakes of the last two years.'

MR HILARY PAULC LOGALI, now Chairman of Juba University Council and a member of the Politburo has, since the Addis Ababa Agreement, been the Regional Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, as well as Speaker of the People's Regional Assembly.

'First of all, I would like to correct a notion. I think it is wrong to call what happened between the government and the Assembly a conflict. What I would say is that there was a group of people in the Regional Assembly who were

vehemently opposed to the President of the High Executive Council. But if you look at the Regional Assembly as a whole, the majority of the Assembly was backing the President of the HEC. Until it was dissolved, the Regional Assembly was behind the government.

But then, certain events took place and led to the dissolution of the Regional and the National Assemblies. A complaint was made by this group to the President of the Republic on changes that took place in the Assembly. They were questioning the constitutionality of the changes in the leadership of the Assembly--the dismissal of the Speaker and his deputies and of the Controller. A committee was formed by the President of the Republic to find out what actually did happen. It appears that those who presented the petition contended that there was some error in the procedure which led to the dismissal of the leaders of the Assembly. I cannot comment on the findings of the Presidential committee since they have not yet been made known to the public. If I recall, what took place was that the SSU body of the Regional Assembly met and withdrew its confidence in the Speaker and the rest of the Assembly leadership. When the Assembly came into session the next day, the nomination speech was presented to the SSU Assembly body by the President of the High Executive Council and was endorsed by the Assembly, and that meant the election of a new Speaker,

deputies and Controller. To answer your question, 'Where did we go wrong?' I would say that we did not try to solve the problem by ourselves through a dialogue with each group. What happened was that each group tried to finish the other; each side wanted to win, and that is where we went wrong. This should be a lesson us in future--to remember that whatever happens we must solve our own problems.'

Mr Joseph Tambura, Regional Minister of Communications,

'It seems to me that soon after the elections there was already a fight between Abel's group and Lagu's group. This created the division from the beginning. As always when there is a division, there is bound to be a tug-of-war. This sort of thing went on for a long time. Joseph's reshuffle caused discontent among the members who supported him when he sought office. These people reacted by trying to find fault with the President. This, of course, was part of the tug-of-war which resulted in the constitutional crisis which forced the President of the Republic to bring an investigation team which was soon followed by the SSU Congress in Khartoum. When the President was given the mandate by the Congress, he thought it wise to close the Assembly and let the members seek a new mandate. This may help in solving the tug-of-war.'

CSO: 4820

'SUDANOW' REPORTS ON FOUR DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Jun 80

[Four part article]

[Jun 80 p 28]

[Text] Oil Pipeline Corporation

Anger at the perennial shortage of petrol and other fuels is regularly, although wrongly, focused on the Pipeline Corporation, who are blamed for the mismanagement of one of the nation's most costly assets. But the pipeline is just one part of a distribution network that links the oil refinery at Port Sudan to the main depot at Shejara, south Khartoum, and the regular retail outlets.

Last month, SUDANOW spoke to Mr Abdel Rahman Suliman, the managing director of the Petroleum Products Pipeline Public Corporation who stressed that the pipeline was working well. 'Provided,' he said, 'we get the oil from the refinery, the pipeline will not let you down.'

Efforts to take the Port Sudan-Khartoum oil pipeline up to design capacity and make it fully multiproduct were taken a stage further last month with the beginning of cleaning operations along its full 820 kilometres. The first 'pig'--the device passed through the pipeline to clean it--was put in on the 5th of last month. Officials described the cleaning operations as 'going along smoothly.' These operations are expected to take about six months and are being carried out by the French Firm, Pipeline Services Company, under a contract signed with the Petroleum Products Pipeline Public Corporation (PPPPC)--alternatively known as 4PC--in March.

This is an important stage in the gaining of oil pipeline expertise, since it will be the first time the pipeline has been cleaned since its inauguration in December 1977. Cleaning, which is important for maintaining the pumps at a high level of efficiency, will be carried out annually in future, following the successful completion of the current operations.

That pipeline cleaning is not without its risks became all-too-clear when operations began. The increase in pressure needed to start the cleaning pig on its way through the pipeline caused a fracture in the joint of the eight-inch main pipe and the six-inch pipe that runs the two kilometres from Burri bridge into the airport. A 30-minute spray of gasoil stopped traffic and brought emergency vehicles to the Gereif road, south of the airport near the junction with the Wad Medani road.

There was no fire or explosion, but signs of the spillage are still clearly to be seen. In the emergency, the PPPPC closed the valve at Burri bridge and put a temporary cap on the joint. The joint has now been properly welded and operations are proceeding well, says the Corporation.

Another pipeline first is expected in September, once the cleaning operations are well under way, when an experimental batch of benzine is to be carried. Benzine, with its low flashpoint, is the most volatile of the products which the pipeline is expected to carry. The PPPPC is anxious to ensure that its handling and safety procedures for carrying the fuel are up to international standards before carrying benzine on a regular commercial basis. The go-ahead to carry benzine will raise 4PC's revenue since benzine attracts a higher tariff than the other 'white' fuels--gasoline, kerosene and aviation turbine fuel--it carries.

The pipeline has been working at 68 percent efficiency lately. At its current working pressure of 1200 lbs per sq inch (psi), the design capacity of the pipeline is 100 cu metres an hour, or 650,000 metric tonnes a year. But this rate is not likely to be achieved until after cleaning has been completed. At the moment, it is running at about 68 cu metres an hour, some 442,000 metric tonnes a year.

Longer term plans will raise the operating pressure to 1600 psi and increase the flow-rate to 143 cu metres an hour--nearly one million metric tonnes a year. The four existing pumping stations at Port Sudan, Rojal, Erkowit and Atbara, are to be augmented by two new booster pumps, at Haiya and near Shendi.

The final details of the improved pipeline system await the completion of the planning stage of another contract signed in March with Omnium Technique de Pipelines (OTP). Under the timetable agreed between OTP and 4 PC, the French company is to draw up detailed engineering studies within five months, that is by the end of August. The full details of their incorporation into the pipeline system will be worked out by next January and the new system is expected to be tested in March 1982 prior to its going into full service. The scheme is being paid for by 4PC, who are being allowed to buy the necessary hard currency at the 50 piastres/dollar rate.

Progress on the working of the pipeline is monitored by a cooperation and coordination committee, which meets twice a year to review future plans and work to date. Members of the committee are drawn from 4PC and from Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP), with whom the Corporation signed a 'transfer of technology' agreement in February last year under which CFP agreed to 'support the PPPPC in all fields of its operations.'

'But this does not mean they have taken over the running of the pipeline,' said Mr Abdel Rahman Suliman, PPPPC's managing director. 'The point about this contract is that CFP gives us back-up support.' Between them, CFP and the Corporation employ some 250 staff, of whom 23 are expatriate on a counterpart training system. Mr Abdel Rahman acknowledged that the number of expatriates might seem high but pointed out that the nature of the operations was very sophisticated and depended upon effective and constant attention.

'In general,' he went on, 'operating standards here are as high as anywhere in the world. We really are members of the club! We keep in touch with similar operations in other parts of the world and there is a regular exchange of information among pipeline operators.'

Bringing the pipeline up to scratch has not been without its problems. But Mr Abdel Rahman rejected as uninformed charges that the laying of the pipeline and the welding operations had been jeopardised by poor quality workmanship.

'We imported pipes from Italy, France and Kuwait. There were no failures in the joint welds. The only defects encountered were during a hydrostatic test run, when operating pressure was raised to 1800 psi. We realised that there were seven pinhole leaks, but they did not reveal themselves. We raised the pressure to 2000 psi, but still we couldn't find them. This took more than six months in 1976. We still haven't found them. But you may rest assured that if we find them we can repair them straight away. In the meantime the pipeline is working very well.' The PPPPC was also keen to dispel charges that it was in competition with the railways as the main carriers of petroleum products. As Mr Abdel Rahman pointed out, the pipeline carries only 40 percent of the national requirement for white fuels and none of the heavier, dark ones. In addition, he said, the pipeline could never match Sudan Railways' nationwide distribution.

[Jun 80 p 29]

[Text] Red Sea Port Development

With the growth of the modern economy and the rise in international trade, few things are more important than an efficient cargo-handling system. This is especially the case when the country has only one major seaport and congestion is to be avoided.

On a visit to Port Sudan last month, senior reporter Alfred Logune Taban found that the Sea Ports Corporation was coming to grips with the problem of cargo handling with schemes to improve the facilities at the main port and to build new ports on the Red Sea. His report:

The modernisation programme at Port Sudan initiated by the Sea Ports Corporation (SPC) in February was last month well under way. When the three-phase programme is completed the SPC expects to have raised its cargo-handling capacity from the current 3.8 million tons a year to 5.7 million tons, an increase of 50 percent. These figures do not include oil of which some 1.25 million tons crude and refined are currently imported.

The first and most important stage is expected to be completed in October 1981. This involves the restructuring of much of the port, the relaying of railway track and the purchase of special ancilliary equipment. The World Bank has given \$22 million, and the British Overseas Development Administration has provided £5.7 million for the ancilliary equipment to be bought from British firms (See Business, last month). The SPC hopes to overcome port congestion and to avoid the delay surcharges that shippers sometimes have to bear.

A visitor to Port Sudan at the beginning of last month would have thought that the very port was being dismantled. Railway tracks were being pulled up--of the 14 kilometres of track there only two months ago only nine remain; a drainage system was being dug; roads were being asphalted and a 5,000-sq metre workshop was being built for handling light repairs such as welding and for battery recharging. Three smaller workshops are to be built.

'All cargo, except the very heaviest, will be carried from the port by lorry. Trains are just too slow,' said Mr Faisal Lutfi, the chief engineer of Livesey and Henderson, the British company planning the reorganisation. The implementation of the project will be handled by another British firm, Marples, Ridgeway Co.

Emphasis is being laid on space for both storage and the easier handling of cargoes. A 230,000-sq metre area is being asphalted during the first phase. Another 318,000 sq metres will be asphalted during Phase 2.

There is also to be a restructuring of the berths. Berths 17 and 18 are to be set aside for oil and as a container terminal for roll on-roll off traffic. During Phase 2, Berth 16 South is also to be modernised to receive ro-ro traffic. Berth 15 will be straightened to receive larger ships and Berths 12, 13, 17 and 18 will also be deepened from 10.7 metres to 11.3 metres to allow ships of up to 50,000 tons to dock. A mobile 75-ton crane is also to be installed. Berths 12, 13 and 14 which are to be restructured around the present silos will be used for oil.

A modern fire-fighting system will also be installed to replace the unreliable tanker system that is currently in use there. Stand-by generators are to be installed to overcome the night handling problems currently experienced when the lighting goes off at 10.00 pm. The 30-metre high floodlights will operate until morning.

The SPC's attempts to ease port congestion do not end with Port Sudan. A new port is to be built at Mersa Kuwai, 90 kilometres south of Port Sudan. When completed--and, as yet no one knows when that is likely to be--the new 40-berth port will handle some ten million tons a year.

Mersa Kuwai is not a replacement for Port Sudan. By the end of Phase 1 which began in 1972, it will have an annual cargo-handling capacity of 1.4 million tons and is being coordinated with the developments at Port Sudan itself. Only when Mersa Kuwai is completed will it operate as a separate entity from Port Sudan.

Although the new port is described as well sheltered and has a good nautical approach with easy connections with inland transport, it is also rather shallow and needs deepening. But a problem deeper even than that, however, is getting the \$30 million necessary for its construction. Where will the money come from? 'Don't ask me!' said Captain Hassan Mohamed Salih, the executive director of SPC. However, SUDANOW understands from a different source that both Saudi Arabia and West Germany have shown interest in the port.

Although too narrow for large ships, the port at Suakin is also to be revived. Suakin was the first port to be built in Sudan but for political reasons--its being associated with the Mahdist, Osman Digna--and because it proved unsuitable for modern ships, the British abandoned it in 1924.

'We want to revive the old home and coast^{al} trade which used to exist,' said Capt Hassan Mohamed. A feasibility study was started last year, paid for by the European Economic Community, who will also finance the port-building project.

Perhaps the single biggest contribution to the improvement of cargo-flow through Port Sudan has been the coming of containerisation. The containers, which are usually of 20-ton capacity, carry goods directly from areas of production and manufacture to areas of consumption, or from port to port.

In a week-long seminar held in Erkowit in April 1979, managers, businessmen and representatives of the transport industry expressed open admiration for the containers system. 'Since the goods are already packed in containers there is less need for labour and the containers are more easily transported, saving both time and space in the ports,' said Capt Hassan Mohamed.

This attitude was endorsed by Faisal Lutfi: 'The system is safe for the owners of goods since there is less possibility of damage. In addition, port efficiency and revenue will be increased as off-loading will take less time, the turn-around times will be cut and more ships will call.'

Despite this 'open-door' attitude towards containerisation, Port Sudan has still to inaugurate the policy officially, since it does not yet have the capacity to handle the system properly. This is why the current restructuring is so important.

'We have only emergency facilities in South Quay for handling containers,' said Capt Hassan Mohamed. 'Ships with containers will not be allowed to dock until the preparations to receive them have been properly made. Ships with their own facilities for container-handling are, of course, welcome.'

Some equipment has already arrived although the bulk of it will not arrive until June 1981 when Berths 17 and 18 become fully equipped for containerisation. Certainly Port Sudan does not want to be, nor can it afford to be, the odd-man-out in the introduction of containers, as most modern ports now handle them as a matter of course.

[Jun 80 p 31]

[Text] Road Transport

The establishment last month of the South Darfur Transport Company with equity provided by the Sudan Development Corporation, local government and the private sector, may serve as a model in the future for the provision of necessary social services which lack the capital required to get under way. The new company is also significant of the development of national transport and delivery services linking the various regions of the country with each other and to the central area.

Senior reporter Berhane Woldegabriel reports:

Some 70 percent of the general cargo carried monthly between Khartoum and Nyala is transported by Sudan Railways, with the rest largely borne by small, independent transport companies. The limited capacity to expand either railways or private road transport commensurate with the growth of population in Darfur and that of its consumer aspirations, has contributed to the steady expansion of the black market in essential commodities.

Transport limitations have also aggravated the structural imbalance of trade from Khartoum to Nyala with relatively little going from Nyala to Khartoum. Thus, while the average rate for road transport from Khartoum to Nyala is £s70 per ton, the rate in the opposite direction, from Nyala to Khartoum, is only £s20, excepting immediately after crop harvests--say, from December to March--when the rate rises to £s50 a ton.

The low profitability of the Nyala to Khartoum run, as well as the limited amount of goods travelling in that direction does not encourage hauliers to go to Nyala. Now, however, thanks to a project jointly financed by the French government, the Sudan Development Corporation (SDC), the Southern Darfur Province People's Executive Council and 20 shareholders from the private sector in Nyala, there exists the possibility of substantially increasing goods traffic to western Sudan.

The South Darfur Transport Co (SDTC), with a planned operating strength of 20 Berliet trucks of 19.5 tons payload capacity, is the outcome of the project--the estimated cost of which is \$1.25 million.

The equity for the new company will comprise \$156,000 from the 20 private shareholders; \$144,000 from Southern Darfur Province People's Executive Council; and \$60,000 from the Sudan Development Corporation (SDC). Of this \$60,000, the equivalent of \$45,000 will be in hard currency. In addition the SDC is to lend the company \$95,000 to be repaid over 15 years with an eight-year grace period. The Sudan government is to lend the equivalent of \$773,496 in French francs, borrowed from France under the Franco-Sudanese Protocol signed in April 1978.

The difficulties of road transport across the 1,250 kilometres which separate Khartoum from Nyala are certainly severe. Although this is slightly less than the distance between Khartoum and Port Sudan, the travelling time is twice as much; this is because the Port Sudan run is nearly completely asphalted while that to Nyala is over rough, unpaved roads. The state of these roads not only increases the journey time but, more importantly perhaps, increases costs, as breakdowns are frequent and the vehicles depreciate more rapidly.

SDTC insists, however, that it will be able to overcome these difficulties and to ensure a dependable service. Not only does it have a main workshop at the company's headquarters in Nyala, it has also made servicing arrangements in Wad Medani and Khartoum with the Renault agencies. Reliable service will also be facilitated by the company's radio system, service vehicles and convoy system, to which will be added a Khartoum workshop some time towards the end of next year.

Reliability is the fundamental promise of SDTC although this will contribute towards higher operating costs than independent hauliers. The Berliet trucks, for example, have a load capacity of about half that of trailer trucks. By using 16 of its 20 lorries--four will be the reserve--SDTC expects to make 32 trips monthly in each direction, a total of some 1,248 tons.

Mr David Castledine, SDTC's general manager, acknowledged the greater load capacity of trailer trucks but insisted, 'Given the current condition of the roads, trailers may well not complete the journey to Nyala. Our Berliet trucks are the ones we thought would dependably do the job.'

Unusual as it may be, SDTC also insures the goods it carries. This, too, will add to operating costs. Mr Castledine remains confident, however, that on balance, the services provided will stand the higher costs. 'We are offering confidence and reliability. Thus, we expect that the people whose goods we transport will be willing to pay us slightly more than they have previously been paying to independent truckers.'

Two factors may impinge upon the success SDTC hopes to enjoy. In the first place, the vehicles are yet to arrive. Five of the 30 Berleit lorries will arrive in the middle of this month along with enough spares to last all 20 vehicles for two years. The remaining 15 vehicles are expected to arrive some time next month. As the dry season begins in Darfur only in October, until that time the lorries will be used on the Khartoum to Port Sudan run.

More importantly in the long term, the higher costs may prove unattractive to merchants. This, anyway, is the opinion of one veteran, independent Bedford driver, Mr Abdu Mukhtar: 'The problem with this hypothetical company is that we will carry goods at far less cost and hence, it will not really be able to compete with us.'

[Jun 80 p 32]

[Text] River Transport

A fleet of 50 general cargo barges, 16 new 1,000-HP tugs, eight flat-deck barges, six oil barges and two floating cranes ordered by the River Transport Corporation (RTC) is expected to be fully assembled and operating by August 1981--six months ahead of schedule.

The first of the three consignments which will make up the full complement has been in regular service since March 26. This includes two tugs, two flat-deck barges, five general cargo barges, a 45-ton floating crane, as well as two of the 16 tugs, each of which is capable of hauling four of the 500-ton cargo barges. The third and final consignment arrived in Port Sudan on the 18th of last month after delays in carrying the equipment from Oslo.

The \$18 million agreement under which the equipment is being delivered was signed in 1978 between the RTC and the Norwegian company, Oil Industry Services (OIS). Although OIS are to construct the vessels, they will be fitted with Duet engines, and Schottel--an OIS subsidiary--'Z'-drive navigation units. Z-drive is a steering technique that allows the propeller housing to be moved through 360°, giving the maximum manoeuvrability in the narrow reaches of the river.

The arrival of the equipment had become urgent partly because of the increasing level of river traffic between the north and the Southern Region--which includes some 2,000 people in each direction every week--

but also because of the rate at which the current fleet was being scrapped. By rescheduling its re-assembly programme--the equipment comes in sections--and by using two additional slipways as dry docks, the RTC has been able to accelerate the launching of six new vessels into service.

Mr Ali Ameer Taha, RTC's chairman, is full of praise for the OIS staff who have been working alongside their Sudanese colleagues at the Corporation's yard in Khartoum North on the re-assembly of the sections.

'The Norwegians are not interested in only selling their equipment,' said Ali Ameer, 'they genuinely want the whole project to succeed. They want to see these boats give a badly-needed service to our people. They work with us, and they are always on the 'yes' side. Can they do this? Yes! Would they do that? Yes! It's a pleasure to work with them.'

When SUDANOW visited the yards in April, the Sudanese and Norwegians were at work on the oil barges. There was also the launching of one of the flat-deck barges which were specially designed for carrying heavy-duty equipment, the lack of which has frustrated progress on a number of projects in the South. Other barges have been designed for carrying bulk durra, allowing mechanical loading and unloading and avoiding the use of expensive sacking.

The RTC has four passenger steamers--Nimule, Halfa, Cineina and Kurmik--currently under assembly, and has been operating six tugs since 1976. These are named after small rivers, like the Gash and the Zaraf. The 16 new tugs are named after trees indigenous to Sudan, such as the Nakhala, Hashaba and the Tibaldi.

An important advantage of the new tugs is that a defective engine can be taken out as a unit, allowing a replacement to be fitted without requiring docking. In addition, the tugs are of safer design and more comfortable than the old ones. Each has a crew of 16 who work round the clock in three shifts. 'The boatmen could be out on the Nile for a month or so,' said Ali Ameer, 'so they need comfort. The captain's and the engineer's cabins are comparable with rooms at the Khartoum Hilton.'

The RTC is looking forward to a healthier financial future once the new vessels are fully operational. With the old boats, said Ali Ameer, it was impossible to break even. 'A vessel with a crew of 14 or 16 and carrying 60 tons of cargo uses about 25 tons of fuel for the round trip between Khartoum and Juba,' he said. 'But these new boats, using the same size crew and say, 35 tons of fuel, can carry 2,000 tons of cargo and go faster.'

Each tug will also be fitted with long-and short-range wireless equipment. The Corporation is now working on improving its radio stations, at Khartoum, Kosti, Malakal, Juba and Karima and establishing new ones at Bor, Shambi, Renk, Jebel Aulia and Dongola.

CSO: 4820

MZALI INTERVIEW IN SAUDI PUBLICATION REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Jun 80 p 4

[Interview with Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party]—date and place not given]

[Text] The Saudi publication AL-RIYAD printed an interview in its last issue with Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the PSD.

In response to a question concerning the broad outlines of the government's political and economic program, Mr Mzali stated:

"In Tunisia, the prime minister's political and economic program amounts to putting into practice the president of the republic's general directives and the basic choices he has settled on, in keeping with the provisions of our constitution and with the character of our system of government and our political traditions.

That this policy might have its own specific characteristics is in the nature of things to the extent that the government's acts are collective acts, coordinated and uniform, and since we know that the members of the present government were not part of the previous government team.

Given that each person has his own idiosyncrasies and each minister has ideas of his own, although there may be a consensus on overall policy directions, it is only logical that certain aspects and certain characteristics are more noticeable than others, even in spite of the fact that the overall political line of the government which has been settled on by the president of the republic will be followed while any readjustments required by events or by changes in the nature of things are being made. In a framework of concern for efficiency and with an eye to maintaining preconditions for progress and for economic and social development for the Tunisian people."

Mr Mohamed Mzali went on:

"Meanwhile, besides these points, I think it is necessary to stress the importance of education and moral standards in society. The success of economic development programs is in this respect dependent on how conscious the masses are of their duties and how concerned they are about safeguarding the highest interests of the nation. In a word, how deep their patriotic sentiment and their self-sacrifice in the service of the public interest are.

In any developmental activity, any political movement, and any social undertaking, the aspect that falls under the rubric of civilization has a kind of influence and importance which makes it the essential factor in the dynamic process of history as it is lived through by peoples. This dynamic process can be an element of decline or of progress in scientific, economic and cultural spheres."

Responding then to a question about the make-up of the government which was formed last 24 April, Mr Mohamed Mzali pointed out that the Supreme Soldier ever since independence has taught his children, the high officials, the principle of alternating responsibilities according to the requirements of efficiency and the nature of the skills needed for a particular set of economic circumstances.

This alternation has no other meaning except that it permits the maximum number possible of energetic and skilled individuals from all social strata and with all different kinds of political sympathies to take on responsibilities by its concern for efficiency and by applying the principle of national unity which is a basic principle of the government in Tunisia.

When asked: "Observers think that you have always kept yourself above disagreements and political conflicts. Are you going to try to take your new position as a starting point for closing up ranks and help unify all political forces including what is referred to as the opposition?"

Mr Mzali answered:

"I have always thought and still think now that there are no fundamental differences between the vital forces of the nation since Tunisian society is known as a middle-of-the-road society which hardly believes in the inevitability of class struggle and which has not known feudalism or a bourgeoisie, unlike what has been the case in other countries. Consequently, differences are not profound ones but they express one conception of what Tunisian society must and ought to be.

"This conception is a common denominator based on national unity and things related to that such as aspiring to democracy and devotion to socialism."

Mr Mzali went on to add further:

"This platform brings together all the country's vital forces and is able to get us to put all of our energy into effectively taking part in building up the country and building for the future. That is why I have always kept apart from what could be called politicking, which verges on "playing politics," in other words politics which is carried on to the detriment of the common interest of the masses and of principles. I have favored constructive, modest and unbiased activity, bearing in mind that all sincere and hard-working Tunisians have a right to this country of ours. For this reason there is nothing wrong with their having a different idea about things as long as they have the same objective, that is building up the nation and its defense. My way of managing the country's business will be like Bourguiba's. That is to say it will be guided by the same spirit and follow the same procedures so that the greatest number of able and energetic people and factions can be gathered around us who will find, I hope, fertile ground for work and for constructive participation in the nation's development."

Asked about the party's role in the political, economic and social struggle, the prime minister stated:

"As you know, the PSD was founded in 1934 by President Bourguiba who had led our national struggle and formed all classes of Tunisians, workers, peasants, industrialists and intellectuals, young and old, men and women, into a single rank. The PSD has been a real gathering place and melting pot rather than a party in the usual sense. Because of this it acquired a historical legitimacy that no one can question, and it became a striking force which faced up to occupying troops and triumphed over them. This force resides in what we call national unity, the party having always maintained an unambiguous approach to all issues relating to political, economic and cultural activity in the course of the various conventions it held during the colonial period.

"Since the time we achieved independence, the party, that assemblage of the people inspired by men who had taken power by means of free elections organized on a regular basis, has turned to the struggle for development in its various domains: the evolution of Tunisian society, improvement of life in general, the improvement of living standards of the Tunisian people, materially as well as culturally, opening up to the outside world, and constructive crises which have allowed us on each occasion to review our line of action and to avoid the dangers that threaten developing countries.

"We will always see to it that the party, along with organizations of national scope and the country's creative energies and organizations, serves as a driving force in political, economic and cultural life, open to all currents of opinion and to all layers of society, to young and old, and making dialogue into a standing practice. We will persevere on this

path on a national, regional and local basis so that the cadres are always equal to their responsibilities from the point of view of ability, integrity, honesty and making their influence felt. The main thing is not just the organizations but also the men who direct them and inspire them with dynamism and vitality."

To the question of how he will be able to fit in his cultural activities with his new responsibilities as prime minister, Mr Mzali answered:

"I am used to taking on several things at the same time, particularly responsibilities in the areas of politics, culture and sports. Up to now I have been able to reconcile all of these responsibilities because I have always attempted to find in them a common denominator, to see if there is an organic link between all the elements of well-rounded development. Therefore I think that my new responsibilities, very heavy ones in other respects, will afford me a more comprehensive view of the elements of development and of progress towards higher civilization. As regards the magazine EL FIKR, it is now in its 25th year and therefore has reached an age of maturity which will allow it to carry on and fulfil its cultural mission even more effectively. As for the Union of Tunisian Writers of which I have been unanimously elected president by my fellow writers, I intend to work with the steering committee members to strengthen the union and promote its activities for this organization is the voice of the people's conscience. I will therefore not spare any effort in this area and do my best to continue to hold the office of union president."

Then when he was speaking about the efforts foreseen by the government to restore culture to its appropriate place in a society aspiring to progress and well-rounded development, Mr Mohamed Mzali stated:

"In all of the positions of responsibility I have held, I have always advocated a greater role for the area of culture in order for intellectuals to contribute more to the creative stage than to development. Many times I have stated that acts of creation in the cultural area are as important as the creation of jobs or building bridges or roads. I have also maintained that cultural output is inseparable from the overall dynamic process of production. I firmly believe in the existence of a close link between all sectors of production, even if it may be difficult to determine precisely, with figures and balance sheets, what output amounts to in the cultural area. That is why it is absolutely essential to agree to further efforts and material assistance to create favorable conditions for creative activity in the area of culture.

"That is what the government will be trying to achieve without skimping on its efforts to encourage writers and artists, to the extent that means permit; after all, it is not up to man to achieve the impossible or to do what lies beyond his means."

Regarding the question of Arabicization in Tunisia, Mr Mohamed Mzali stated:

"I am anxious to reassure our brothers that the administrative machinery and government institutions have been switched to Arabic with the exception of areas that relate to other countries and purely technical matters. So for example the judicial system and investigative police have been working in Arabic since independence. In the area of education, we have by now shifted all the humanities such as history, geography and philosophy into Arabic. However we have retained French in the teaching of the exact sciences for two reasons: the current lack of professors able to teach these subjects in Arabic, and our concern for keeping direct lines of communication to modern sciences without needing an intermediary, in this case the translator. Whatever else it may be, the matter of Arabicization is not in our eyes something of a sentimental nature, it is rather a matter which we treat logically and taking the common interest into account. That is why it is necessary to move forward step by step with Arabicization so as to guarantee the quality of training and insure it is at the required level. We have no complex about this. Tunisia has always been and still remains very much attached to the fact that it belongs to the Arab-Islamic civilization. As an endorsement of this, I remind you that the Supreme Soldier based his struggle against colonialism on the fact that Tunisia is the foremost bastion of Arab civilization and of Islam north of the Sahara."

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CSO: 4400

TUNISIA

MZALI PRAISED FOR REALISTIC APPROACH

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 May 80 p 1

[Editorial: "A Realistic Approach"]

[Text] In his interview with the magazine EL MOSTAQBAL, Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister, spoke among other things about Tunisia's policy in the area of defense and weaponry. A policy shaped in its entirety by the particularly troubled times that the international community is going through, especially after the unhappy events at Gafsa which, as Mr Mzali emphasized, reminded us of the need to equip our armed forces with the means necessary to safeguard the country's independence.

Considering the impressive progress achieved every year in the development and testing of new weapons, and considering as well the very high cost of sophisticated military equipment, Tunisia has neither the desire nor the wherewithal to provide itself with a powerful army. What it is trying for in this area, also so as not to restrain its social and economic development efforts, is a minimum level of resources for defense and deterrence. Putting it another way, to place at the disposal of the Tunisian army, which is not short of men, the means which will allow it to make the defense of the nation's territory secure.

Moreover, Tunisia, which has friends it is sure of and who it can count on when times are tough, is convinced that real strength lies more in continuous improvement of its citizens' living standards and from unity among the ranks of the population. First of all, because a nation of people who see their living conditions improve from day to day is more confident about its future and its leaders. Then also because a united nation whose people stick together is a veritable rampart on which all enemy onslaughts will be shattered. The Tunisian people, united behind Bourguiba, has always produced proof of this on every occasion.

And finally, because this is an approach which meets the country's current needs and at the same time protects its future.

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CSO: 4400

TUNISIA

OUTCOME, CONDUCT, SIGNIFICANCE OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Guiga Assesses Elections

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 May 80 pp 1, 5

[Unsigned article: "Mr Guiga Adds Up the Results of the Municipal Elections: Evidence of the Deep Fellowship Which Has Always Existed Between the People and the Supreme Soldier"]

[Text] Minister of the Interior Driss Guiga held a press conference yesterday afternoon at his department's main offices in the course of which he made an appraisal of the municipal elections and drew lessons from them.

In regard to the voting, the minister first of all called attention to the changes that have been recorded in the numbers of both municipal councils and councillors. The number of municipalities went from 154 in 1975 to 166 at present. And the number of councillors went up to 2486 during the current election, marking an increase of 250. The number of registered voters is 1,200,829. The number that cast ballots was 807,511. The number of disqualified ballots was 90,083. The level of participation varies between 55 and 98 percent.

"Besides, it is important to emphasize," the minister went on, "the increase in the number of women that were elected. This number went from 117 during the last term of municipal office to 213, or 96 more.

As for the age mix, it works out as follows:

--Between 25 and 30 years old:	36 percent of the councillors-elect
--Between 36 and 50 years old:	46 percent of the councillors-elect
--Over 50 years old	: 18 percent of the councillors-elect

I would like as well to make some comments about this election.

These comments are related first of all to the number of candidates who were elected for the first time. This amounted to more than two-thirds

of the total body of new councillors. Then we should note the openings created for persons of ability and young people at all levels, in all social strata and in all social categories.

Furthermore, the municipal elections highlighted how cohesive all sections of the population are around the Destourian Socialist Party candidates, which gives evidence of how solid our national unity is.

These party lists did indeed include representatives of all social categories.

Furthermore, these elections were marked by the deep sense of fellowship which has always existed between the Tunisian people and the Supreme Soldier. This fellowship found particular expression in the success of the women's contingent following on recommendations made along these lines by President Bourguiba.

Now that these elections have drawn to a close I would like to draw certain lessons from them. First of all, there is the matter of the atmosphere which has characterized the electoral campaign as well as the elections. An atmosphere full of people, or rather, like a festival, at the same time as it was a chance for the masses to exercise their democratic rights in the context of their ongoing dialog with the Bourguiba government.

This is the proof, if any is needed, that the Bourguiba government and our constitutional institutions are dynamic ones and are constantly changing to keep in tune with the aspirations of the people."

Mr Driss Guiga went on:

"I would like also to thank the press and all other information media for the effort they have displayed with a view to covering these municipal elections. I direct my thanks as well to all those who took part in the preparations for these elections and particularly the officials of the Ministry of the Interior, of the Governorates, of the commissions, of the municipalities, as well as all the volunteer citizens who participated in ballot-counting and in physical preparations for the elections.

Besides, we must thank the candidates who were not elected for the sportsmanship they showed to the extent that they accepted the verdict of the electorate, ready to work side by side with the newly elected representatives in a disciplined, committed and determined fashion.

I would also like to congratulate the councillors-elect on the new responsibilities they will be taking on in the municipal framework. I have no doubt they will measure up to taking on these duties with self-sacrifice and commitment and that they will be equal to their task.

To conclude, I congratulate the Tunisian people for the degree of maturity that they have achieved and that they showed at the time of these last elections. This maturity both shows how the people are capable of exercising their democratic rights, and is a sign of the profound understanding which exists between the masses and the Bourguiba government.

'DIALOGUE' Assesses Elections

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 26 May 80 pp 20-21

[Editorial by Hammadi Ben Hammed: "Municipal Elections '80: Why the Test Was Conclusive"]

[Text] The Destourian Socialist Party's appeal for extensive participation by the electorate in the 1980 municipal elections was indeed heard.

The results are in. Convincing ones. Edifying ones.

Democratic sovereignty has been brought into play by the overwhelming majority of the voting public.

The exercise of the duty of citizenship reached its peak.

There was no voter abstention or civic passiveness as certain people had given us to understand there would be.

The act of voting was not a mere formality.

When they went to the polls on the 25 May 1980 the Tunisians performed an act of faith.

--Faith in the party's development-oriented policy, a policy which has succeeded in getting the country onto the track of irreversible economic and social advancement.

--Faith in the value of the democratic system as it operates in Bourguibian Tunisia, a progressive system in which the ideal and reality meet, and which can adapt itself to changed conditions and to the aspirations of the people. Which can also disavow dogmatic blunders and magic recipes.

--Finally, faith in this new spirit of optimism and hope which is becoming more and more intense and increasingly widespread. A spirit which is forming new solidarity and awakens a renewal of enthusiasm and fervor.

Actually, the election turn-out on Sunday went beyond the basic scope of the practice of universal suffrage as it is set up in multiparty systems.

Tunisians went of course to place their ballot in the ballotbox, but their actions were by far more significant than is indicated by this

gesture, which their citizenship calls on them to perform once every 5 years. Because Tunisians were acting in a spirit of true democracy.

The kind of democracy that, although it considers holding periodic and regular elections to be an essential foundation of popular sovereignty, goes beyond this meaning of the word, which is far too mechanical, to giving the exercise of a citizen's rights and duties its full effective value.

Tunisian democracy is not, in fact, a "democracy by fits and starts."

Much less a "show biz democracy."

Its goal is to involve the greatest number of people in building effectively for the future by awakening civic and political awareness, by promoting participation, by nurturing the citizen's freedom to find his own way and to act knowledgeably.

Therefore it is a genuine democracy, an abiding one, and is intensely experienced.

So the exercise of the duty of citizenship reached its peak last Sunday.

Of course it falls to sociologists to "scientifically" analyze the elements of this new behavior of the Tunisian voter.

Nevertheless one thing is certain.

Both the quantitative and the qualitative results recorded are the "unavoidable" consequences of tangible factors.

First.

--The political maturity of Tunisians.

"Working" for human evolution, something Bourguiba has spearheaded since 1934, has had abundant results.

Tunisians today know how to take on responsibility, the mark of their status as free men. They know as well how to tell what's in the best interest of their country, to support responsible programs, and to choose between the roads to adventurism and to wisdom. And they know how to sort out the elements of an action-oriented ethical code which gives them worth and transcends them.

Nowadays Tunisians cannot be led by dreams. You cannot murmur sweet nothings to them.

Much less consider them whirling dervishes, or just plain dervishes.

Following on this:

--How clean the elections were.

Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the party, insisted on "the freedom, without any restrictions, with which each citizen must exercise his vote to select among the candidates the councillors he regards as most competent and most honorable without weighing any other consideration." In other words, he called for strict adherence to the system now in operation as a result of the more extensive slates of candidates.

So, no partisan intervention in the electoral process.

No manipulation or falsification in vote-counting.

No favoritism. No shady dealing. No "excessive zeal."

And if there has to be an electoral campaign, it must be regarded as an extension of the dialog which underlies all social interaction in Tunisia. The health and well-being and the clear-mindedness of our political life are at stake, as are the honesty and integrity of those who are practitioners in it.

Mr Mohamed Mzali's speech is clear about this: he is dogmatically insistent that officials at all levels by their acts and words be true to Bourguibian political ethics and be resistant to temptations and to the unwholesome pleasures of playing politics.

--Another remarkable fact.

This is the resolute willingness of Tunisians to commit themselves without reservation to planning collective efforts, to play a full part in resolving development problems, by tangible contributions as well as by freely expressing their opinions, all the more so since today's new age looks positively on active effort, on making public life more dynamic, on resurgence, and on any initiative, wherever it comes from, if it is conducive to reinforcing momentum on the road to progress.

Therefore;

Now that the balloting is concluded and each citizen has made a free choice--a choice in terms of responsibility but also as a matter of pride to have performed a political act, in the full meaning of those words, in order to determine his future--there remain, in all their vastness, huge tasks to accomplish, since voting--we specifically pointed this out--is only a highly visible aspect, among others, of public life.

In Tunisia we definitely cannot be content with politics which has seasonal ups and downs, which heats up at times of crisis or jumps in response to "instructions" or "prescriptions" offered by political machines. A free citizen is a continuous participant by nature and by calling. A free citizen does not treat politics like a feast; his role does not consist of feeding into applause and reacting with made-to-order reflexes.

A free citizen is one who only offers his support after reflection, who only takes part because he knows his participation is necessary and that it fits into the common good, who only takes on responsibility because he starts things up and gets things done and has dreams, and finally who only applauds because he knows the difference between hollow and false words, and words not belied by actions.

This free citizen is therefore called upon to hold his aspirations in high regard, since, when all is said and done, the nation falls back on him in the first instance, power cannot be exercised by proxy, and the officials in whom he has placed his trust and to whom he has given his approval need his constant surveillance--his critical surveillance--in order for their activity to achieve as much as possible.

Besides, isn't that a basic strength of the lessons taught by the Bourguibian system?

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